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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
6th Circuit
Eclipse Resources-Ohio, LLC v. Madzia, No. 17-3145, 2017 WL 5903351
(6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017).
Lessor entered into and oil and gas lease with Lessee, which was later
assigned to Assignee. Upon assignment, Lessor and Assignee amended the
lease to mandate compliance with all laws, to require prompt delivery of
documents and other instruments and to take action reasonably necessary to
carry out the amendment, and to include a pooling provision. Subsequently,
the parties entered into another agreement which granted Assignee a
subsurface easement on Lessor’s tract. Two sets of wells were at issue: one
set was located on Lessor’s property and a second set was located nearby.
Assignee originally sought declaratory judgment entitling it to drill the
second set of wells from Lessor’s property. Lessor counterclaimed asserting
numerous claims, all of which were dismissed by the district court except
for the breach of the covenant of good-faith claim. Consequently, the
district court found it appropriate for Assignee to drill the second set of
wells through Lessor’s property based upon the lease and amendments. On
appeal, the court considered whether the district court erred in determining
that Assignee had the right to drill the second set of wells from Lessor’s
property, whether it erred in granting summary judgment against Lessor for
his breach of contract claim, and whether it erred in granting summary
judgment against Lessor that Assignee did not breach the covenant of goodfaith. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the lease,
unmodified by the easement agreement, unambiguously granted Assignee
the right to drill the second set of wells from Lessor’s property.
Additionally, the court held the lease and amendments were not breached
by failure to comply with all applicable laws and agreed that Assignee did
not breach the covenant of good-faith. This case is an unpublished opinion
of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing
the case as precedent.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4

2018]

Recent Case Decisions

1217

9th Circuit
Energy Invs., Inc. v. Greehey & Co., Ltd., 705 Fed. Appx. 655 (Mem)
(9th Cir. 2017).
After the district court found that the Area of Mutual Interest Agreement
(“AMI”) unambiguously required Company-1 to pay Company-2 prospect
fees for mineral acreage acquired by Company-1 or its agents, Company1 appealed, arguing that the AMI for oil and gas leases contained a latent
ambiguity because it did not contain language stating Company-1 had to
pay Company-2 a prospect fee for shale prospects, nor did it describe the
circumstances under which a fee must be paid. However, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the contract defined a prospect fee to mean “[a]
fee of $50.00 per net mineral acre for all Oil and Gas Interest acquired
by [Company-1] or [a Company-1] subsidiary during the terms of this
Agreement, payable to [Company-2] subject to the terms of this
Agreement.” It reasoned that the language of this provision was
“reasonably susceptible to only one construction” and that Company-1 had
to pay Company-2 $50.00 for each net mineral acre that was acquired
by Company-1 or its subsidiary during the term of the AMI, even
if Company-2 did not contribute to securing the lease. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
D. New Mexico
XTO Energy v. Furth, Case No. 15 CV 1180 JAP/KK, 2017 WL 5891740
(D.N.M. Nov. 11, 2017).
Lessee obtained a federal oil and gas lease. Lessee assigned the lease to
Assignee but reserved for himself a production payment. The payment
consisted of a limit of $920,000.00. The payment came from five percent of
the market value of the oil and gas produced. When Lessee died, the
interest became the property of his wife, and upon her passing became
property of a Trust established to benefit Wife’s daughters. In 2002,
Company obtained the lease and started making payments to the Trust. In
2014 payments stopped because of the realization that the Trust had been
overpaid. In order for a Company to prevail in an unjust enrichment
Company must show that Trust knowingly benefited at Company’s
“expense and that it would be unjust for [the Trust] to retain the benefit.”
When Company obtained the lease, the Assignee had already paid the trust
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$468,643.44 leaving $451,356.56 of remaining interest. Trust makes the
argument that Company negligently failed to check the payments it was
required to make and that because it overpaid because of its own actions it
is not required to receive restitution. The court denied both parties motion
for summary judgment because although Company had a valid claim for
restitution, denial was appropriate on the grounds of equity and it failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support the motion.
E.D. Oklahoma
Chieftain Royalty Co. v. B.P. Am. Prod. Co., No. 16-CV-444-JHP, 2017
WL 5012586 (E.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2017).
Royalty Owners, as a class, sued Producer for breach of its express duties to
pay royalties on fuel gas. Royalty Owners claimed that Producer knowingly
underpaid royalties by not paying royalties on fuel gas and failed to disclose
the practice to Royalty Owners. Royalty Owners sought to recover owed
royalties and brought claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) tortious breach
of contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) fraud and deceit; (5) an accounting;
and (6) an injunction. Producer sought to dismiss all claims due to issue
preclusion. First, the court allowed breach of contract claim because
Royalty Owners included specific allegations about the express lease terms
and were not required to attach all the leases. Second, the court dismissed
Royalty Owners’ claim for tortious breach of contract because requisites
were not met, and courts are reluctant to expand the required “special
relationship” to oil and gas leases. Third, Producer unsuccessfully argued
the unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because there is an
adequate remedy for the alleged breach of contract. Fourth, the court denied
Producer’s motion to dismiss the fraud and deceit claims because the
allegations were sufficiently particular for such claims, Royalty Owners
were not required by Oklahoma law to request royalty information from
Producer, and violation of Oklahoma’s reporting requirements was an
adequate basis for a fraud claim. Finally, the court denied Producers’
motion to deny an accounting and an injunction because Royalty Owners
sufficiently pleaded a request for equitable relief.
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N.D. Ohio
Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 4:09-cv-2256, 2017 WL4810703
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2017).
Lessors claimed that their leases, which provided that Lessee pay them a
royalty equal to one-eighth the value of the gas produced each month,
were breached when Lessee began to deliberately and fraudulently
underpay the full gas royalty in the name of post-production cost
deductions. They further alleged that, although the gas wells at issue
produced oil in addition to gas, no oil royalties were ever paid. At issue was
whether the "at the well" rule, which Lessee argued in favor of, applied or
the "marketable product" rule, which Lessors argued in favor of, applied.
The court concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court would adopt the "at the
well rule" in favor of Lessee, which advocated a simple application of the
clear and unambiguous language of the leases. The court reasoned that the
issue could be put in terms of where the gas was to be valued for purposes
of determining plaintiff's royalty payments. Thus, it understood the use of
the language "market value at the well" in the royalty
provision to identify the location at which the gas was valued for purposes
of calculating Lessors' royalties. Construing the lease under the "marketable
product" rule would ignore the clear language that royalties are to be paid
based on "market value at the well."
N.D. Oklahoma
Petroflow Energy Corp. v. Sezar Energy, L.P., No. 16-CV-700-TCK-JFK,
2017 WL 4399193 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2017).
Operator-1 and Operator-2 entered into an agreement to exchange working
interests and jointly develop wells and infrastructure in an area of mutual
interest. The parties later disputed the meaning of certain terms and
provisions in the agreement. Operator-1 filed suit in state court for breach
of contract based upon the disputed terms of the agreement; Operator-2
removed to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction. Both parties
then moved for summary judgment on Operator-1’s breach of contract
claim and each’s own affirmative defenses of failure of consideration.
Additionally, Operator-1 moved for partial summary judgment regarding
certain arguments and defenses made by Operator-2. The court denied
Operator-2’s motion because, after reviewing the plain language of the
agreement, it found that Operator-2 did not show that Operator-1’s breach

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1220

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

of contract claim failed as a matter of law. Additionally, regarding the
affirmative defense of failure of consideration, the court found that
Operator-2 was not entitled to rescind the contract for lack of consideration.
Next, the court reviewed Operator-1’s motion for partial summary
judgment in which they sought to preclude Operator-2 from asserting five
different defenses or arguments. The defenses all dealt with the
interpretation of the specific agreement between the parties. After analysis,
the court granted Operator-1’s motion for partial summary judgement.
N.D. West Virginia
Bezilla v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC, No. 5:17CV123 (STAMPT), 2017 WL
5297941 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 13, 2017).
Landowner sued Lessee for breach of an oil and gas lease and for trespass
on his land. Lessee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
asserting that Landowner sought to terminate the lease without the consent
of his mineral interest cotenants. Landowner argued that the cotenants’
consent is not required because his property rights are separate from the
rights of his cotenants. The district court granted Lessees motion to dismiss.
The court rejected Landowner’s argument, finding that the mineral interest
was leased jointly with the other mineral owners; therefore, Landowner
could not seek to unilaterally terminate the lease without the consent of his
cotenants.
S.D. Ohio
Crothers v. Statoil USA Onshore Props., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-261, 2017 WL
6035232 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017).
Landowners sued Operators, alleging that Operators’ activities near their
home caused physical damage to their home’s foundation and a diminution
in property value. Landowners also charged Operators with interfering with
the use and enjoyment of their land via noise, light and air pollution, and
substantial inconvenience and mental anguish. Landowners claimed that
Operators operated a well in certain proximity of their home and their barn
in violation of an agreement between Operators and a prior owner. Operator
moved for summary judgment, and the lower court granted Operator’s
motion on all claims except for the nuisance claim. The court found that
Landowners did not legally own the land – instead, it was under one of their
father’s name. Nevertheless, the court ruled that Landowners could still

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4

2018]

Recent Case Decisions

1221

pursue their nuisance allegations claiming interference with their daily use
of the property due to loud noises, vibrations, dust, and light pollution.
Landowners subsequently moved for summary judgment on the nuisance
claim, asserting that they have more than enough legal interest as long term
occupants of the subject residence to pursue their nuisance claims. The
court held that Landowners’ lawsuit against a hydraulic fracturing operator
could proceed because they have a right to occupy their property free of
nuisance and further held that Landowners had standing for their claim
despite the frac-well being on property owned by someone else.
W.D. Louisiana
Magee v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Props. (N.A.), L.P., No. 15-2097, 2017
WL 5472521 (W.D. La. Nov. 13, 2017).
Lessee sued Operator, seeking royalties, damages for nonpayment of
royalties, additional bonus payments, and accounting for the relevant wells.
The leases between Lessee and Operator contained language that allowed
Operator to remain free from default on royalty payments until thirty days
after any suit, claim, dispute or question has been entirely resolved.
Additional language in the leases provided that Operator would pay Lessee
an additional consideration of $4,975.00 per net mineral acre if Lessee
successfully establish that the Mineral Servitude expired prior to each
lease’s granting period. Under a ruling by the district court and affirmed by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Lessee was found to be due unpaid
balances on the bonuses with interest. After Operator failed to pay the
prescribed payments due, Lessee mailed Operator a copy of the Second
Circuit’s judgment and, thereafter, Operator paid Lessee the full amount
due. Citing state law, the district court found that Operator did not violate
the lease by withholding the payment because Lessee was not found to be
in strict compliance in providing the requisite documents in order to
provide the required certified proof. Because the leases states that specific
parties must furnish the certified copy of judgment disposing of the
previous suit, the court held Lessee did not meet the strict compliance
required by having a third-party to the original leases send Operator the
required documents. Because Lessee and Operator entered into agreement
that discovery for the amount of royalties due was incomplete, the court
held Lessee’s order of accounting to be premature. The court dismissed
Lessee’s additional claim for legal interest on the bonus payment as the
payment was not due until Operator received the requisite documents.
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Upstream – State
Illinois
Ramsey Herndon, LLC v. Whiteside, 2017 IL 121668.
Operator sued Partner when it learned that Partner had extracted oil from
Lessor’s property without paying Operator its overriding royalty interest
(“ORRI”). Partner claimed that the Assignment signed by Operator
assigning Partner “all of [their] right, title and interest in and to the oil, gas
and mineral leases . . . together with a like interest in and to all personal
property located therein” included the ORRI originally held by Operator.
Operator claimed that because paragraph six of the Assignment read that
the Partner’s interest shall “bear its proportionate share of . . . [ORRI] there
must be some [ORRI] that for [Partner] to pay.” The Illinois Supreme Court
found that the language of the contract was unambiguous, and Operator had
willingly conveyed “all” of its interest in the estate, including the ORRI.
Therefore, paragraph six functioned to show that an ORRI still exists, but
Operator had conveyed it to Partner. Therefore, Partner still must pay the
owner of that interest the ORRI. However, since Partner owns the ORRI,
this is not strictly necessary. Because the Assignment did not contain any
reservation clauses found in other contracts, Operator’s entire interest was
conveyed by the instrument, and Partner owes Operator no ORRI payments.
Kansas
G & B Mining, LLC v. Schemm, 404 P.3d 701 (Table) (Kan. Ct. App.
2017).
Landowner owned all surface rights and one-half of the mineral rights to
the land at issue. A previous owner conveyed the other half of the mineral
rights to Joint Mineral Owner (“Owner”) through a mineral deed. Based on
the mineral deed, Owner also claimed ownership of one-fourth of
Landowner’s mineral rights. Owner sued to recover possession of the
mineral interest and/or to eject Landowners from the portion of land to
which Owner claimed mineral rights. They further sought to “quiet title in
themselves of their interest.” The trial court dismissed Owner’s claims for
failure to prosecute; all claims were dismissed with prejudice except for the
partition claim. Subsequently, Owner again sued seeking the partition he
previously requested. This request was again dismissed for failure to state a
claim and Owner appealed. The appellate court found that no new evidence
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or facts had been presented by Owner since his first petition for partition
and held that since Owner had not addressed the grounds for the district
court's dismissal nor shown error in the previous judgments, the judgment
was presumed valid and should be affirmed.
Louisiana
Suire v. Oleum Operating Co., 2017-117 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/21/17); 2017
WL 4987635.
Overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) Owners brought suit against current
oil and gas Operator for unpaid ORRI, penalties, and attorney fees.
Additional royalty interest owners intervened. Operator filed reconventional
demand, asserting that it was entitled to an offset and/or recoupment of
ORRI, and seeking damages for a misrepresentation of the condition of a
wellbore. Operator also filed third-party complaint against a Prior Operator,
claiming that it was entitled to reimbursement of ORRI payments
erroneously made to Prior Operator and for damages related to the
wellbore. Prior Operator filed a reconventional demand against current
operator, alleging breach of purchase and sale agreement. Trial court
entered judgment in favor of Owners and Operator appealed. The appellate
court affirmed and remanded, holding that the proportionate reduction
clause contained in the conveyance documents of the assignment of the
prior lease from Prior Operator to Operator did not affect calculation of
ORRI and that the failure of the trial court to award ORRI owners penalties
or attorney fees for Operator’s failure to pay ORRI was not a manifest
abuse of discretion.
Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., 2017-464 (La. App. 3
Cir. 10/18/17); 229 So.3d 993.
Operator was found liable for environmental damage due to oil and gas
exploration activities on Landowner’s property. At trial, Operator moved to
adopt State Regulator’s remediation plan under state law, which states that
the court should adopt the plan for “evaluation or remediation” unless
another party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that another plan
is more feasible. The trial court denied Operator’s motion and ordered
Operator to perform additional work, and because the plan was only
partially remedial in nature, some elements of the plan called for evaluation
in the form of future testing. On appeal, the appellate court conceded that
while the plan was denied without any evidence that another plan was more
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feasible, the trial court did not err. The panel reasoned that the trial judge
acts as a “gatekeeper,” to ensure that land is remediated effectively.
Therefore, courts have the power to reject a plan it determines is
incomplete, despite the language found in the state law.
North Dakota
Black Hills Trucking, Inc. v. N.D. Indus. Comm’n, 2017 ND 284, 904
N.W.2d 326.
Transporter appealed a judgment affirming a large penalty imposed by
North Dakota Industrial Commission (“Commission”) for illegally dumping
saltwater, a byproduct of oilfield production, on local roads near a saltwater
disposal well. Commission received multiple reports of incidents of the
illegal disposal. Commission claimed violations of state administrative code
for dumping the fluids on multiple occasions, for allowing the fluid to
infiltrate the soil, and for failure to properly remove the discharged fluids
from the roads. An evidentiary hearing was held in front of an ALJ which
recommended that the complaints against Transporter be dismissed.
However, the Commission rejected the ALJ’s recommendations and
approved an alternate decision against Transporter by civilly penalizing it
$950,000.00. The district court affirmed Commission’s order. On appeal,
Transporter first argued that Commission lacked jurisdiction to impose a
penalty for the discharge of waste away from an oil and gas site.
Interpreting state administrative code broadly, the court found that
Commission properly exercised its jurisdiction over Transporter’s illegal
discharge. Second, Transporter claimed that if Commission had
jurisdiction, its penalty encroached on the jurisdiction of the Department of
Health (“Department”). However, the court held that the Department did
not have primary jurisdiction over the oilfield waste matter and either
Department or Commission could have exercised jurisdiction. Third,
Transporter claimed that the penalty was excessive in violation of the state
constitution. The court held that Transporter did not meet the evidentiary
burden of proving that the actions of Commission were unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the
Commission’s order.
Hallin v. Inland Oil & Gas Corp., 2017 ND 254, 903 N.W.2d 61.
Lessors sued Operator claiming that oil and gas leases did not cover the
entirety of a certain parcel of land. Lessors argued that the lease covered
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only sixty acres and the remaining twenty acres were not leased. Operator
argued that leases covered eighty acres because it conveyed all of Lessors’
mineral interests. Lessors and Operator moved for summary judgment.
After concluding the leases were unambiguous, the district court granted
summary judgment to Operator. Lessors appealed. The Supreme Court of
North Dakota affirmed for several reasons. First, the court agreed that the
lease was unambiguous because the leases specified that included was “all
that certain tract of land” within the parcel. Second, because the leases were
clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible. Finally,
because Lessors had executed unambiguous leases conveying all of their
mineral interest to Operator, Lessors were not entitled to equitable relief of
partial cancellation.
Sundance Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hess Corp., 2017 ND 269, 903 N.W.2d 712.
Lessee 1 was granted a lease by Lessors in 2011 and recorded the lease in
the same year. Lessee 1 then drilled three wells on the land. Lessee 2
performed an investigation and title search into the land leased to Lessee 1,
but did not find Lessee 1 or Lessors in connection with the land. Lessee 2
petitioned to create a trust for the predecessor in interest of Lessors, which
the court granted because Lessee had done the investigation. The trustee
executed a lease with Lessee 2 in 2013. Lessee 2 then filed a quiet title
action to have title of the property declared to belong to it and not Lessee 1.
Lessee 2 moved for summary judgment, asserting that the trust action
caused res judicata on the issue of title to the leasehold interest. Lessee 2
also contended that it was a good faith purchaser of the interest because of
its prior title search and investigation. The district court agreed with Lessee
2 and granted summary judgment. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
reversed, holding that res judicata does not apply since the quiet title action
was different in kind from the trust action. The court also held that there
was a genuine dispute over the material fact of whether Lessee 2 was a
good faith purchaser. To be considered a good faith purchaser according to
the court, an entity must not be on actual or constructive notice of superior
title of another before the purchase. The court observed that applicable
North Dakota law stated that the recording of a lease puts all others on
constructive notice of an entity’s claim of superior right. The court then
reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings.
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Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2017 ND 231, 903 N.W.2d 51.
Mineral Owners conveyed land to State but reserved the mineral estate.
State built a dam and flooded the area conveyed, then later leased the
minerals to various companies. Mineral Owners brought suit to quiet title to
the mineral estate. The trial court granted summary judgment for State
giving it both the mineral and surface estate. Mineral Owners appealed
alleging that the State had committed a taking for which it had not
compensated the Mineral Owners for, that new statutory law that had been
enacted after trial but before appeal applied, and that summary judgment
was improper because there was a genuine issue as to material facts. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Mineral Owners on all issues.
State had committed a taking if the mineral estate had been granted to State
and if the flooding by the state had deprived Mineral Owners of their rights
although Mineral Owners had been able to lease to oil and gas companies
despite the flooding. The new statutory law applied because it was enacted
during the appellate period and stated that it had a retroactive effect. There
were disputed material facts because the parties disputed whether the
flooding was a result of State action and whether the flooded area is part of
Lake Sakakawea or of the Missouri River.
Texas
Bradley v. Shaffer, No. 11-15-00247-CV, 2017 WL 5907319 (Tex. App.
Nov. 30, 2017).
Beneficiary, along with his sister, was vested one-third of a mineral trust
established by his grandparents. The trust contained the following provision
pertaining to its duration: “This Trust shall be for a term of twenty (20)
years from the latest date of execution by an initial Trustor. This Trust may
be continued upon unanimous agreement of all beneficiaries hereunder.”
Beneficiary conveyed his ownership of the land in question to Recipient
and later granted Recipient his mineral interests which were subject to the
trust and any interest held in trust that he might acquire in the future. Prior
to the twenty-year anniversary of the trust, the Trustees along with
Beneficiary filed suit against Recipient seeking a declaratory judgment that
the conveyances to Recipient were void with respect to the mineral interests
held by the trust. Subsequent Trustees executed an extension of the trust
that extended it for another twenty years. In the suit, the Trustees asserted
that the trust owned all the mineral interests and that Beneficiary did not
have any title in the minerals to convey to Recipient. Recipient
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subsequently asserted that Beneficiaries interest was officially conveyed to
him out of the trust after the death of his grandfather, the original trust
holder, and the extension of the trust by Trustees was void because it
violated the rule of perpetuities. The trial court found that Beneficiary did
not have authority to convey his interest to Recipient and voided all
conveyances to Recipient. Recipient appealed, and the appellate court
affirmed the lower court, holding that an extension of a trust does not
violate the rule of perpetuities and since the mineral interest never left the
trust, Beneficiaries conveyance to Recipient was void as a matter of law.
Fitzgerald v. Cadle Co., NO. 12–16–00338–CV, 2017 WL 4675513 (Tex.
Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017).
Creditor obtained an agreed judgment against a mineral interest owner
(“Owner”). After several failed attempts to collect the judgment, Creditor
asked the trial court to order Owner to turnover royalty payments from the
mineral lease to him. The trial court issued such order and further ordered
Owner to provide disclosures of all property and to file periodic
accountings. Owner filed a motion to vacate the turnover order, asserting
that the property was his homestead and, therefore, the royalty payments
were protected from turnover. The trial court denied the motion and Owner
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded the order for two
reasons. First, Owner and Creditor stipulated that the property in question
was Owner’s homestead. Under Texas law, homestead property is exempt
from turnover. As such, the royalty payments are protected from turnover,
and the trial court abused its discretion in denying Owner’s motion to
vacate. Second, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Owner to
provide disclosures and accountings because the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering the turnover of exempt property and there was no
evidence of any other non-exempt property.
Hahn v. Gips, No. 13-16-00336-CV, 2017 WL 4837877 (Tex. App. Oct.
26, 2017).
Landowner 1 sued Landowner 2 and Company claiming he had a oneeighth (“1/8th”) royalty interest in Tract A of land and that he had a onefourth (“1/4th”) mineral interest in Tract B of land. In response, Landowner
2 filed motion for summary judgment claiming that previous conveyances
(the “2002 partition deeds,” or “partition deeds”) did not refer to
reservations of mineral estates and, therefore, Landowner 1 only retained a
1/8th royalty interest in Tract A. Among other things, the lower court
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granted Landowner 2’s motion for summary judgment and, denied
Landowner 1’s partial motion for summary judgment and, as such,
Landowner 1 is only entitled to a 1/8th royalty interest for a term of fifteen
years. On appeal, the appellate court found that because other cotenants of
the mineral estate were not included in the partition deeds, no cotenant is
bound by the partition deed. This means it was an error of the lower court to
find that the partition deeds transferred “anything more than the surface
estate of Tract A and Tract B,” and after the partition deeds Landowner 1
retained a 1/4th interest of the mineral estate. Therefore, the subsequent
deed between Landowner 1 and Landowner 2 which reserved a 1/8th
royalty interest, conveyed a one hundred percent transfer of the surface
estate to Landowner 2 and a 1/4th interest in the mineral rights of the parent
property (Tracts A and B).
VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle, No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL 5162546
(Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2017).
Landowners owned the surface estate of an 8,500-acre tract of land that
they used to run a commercial hunting business and cattle operation; the
main source of income for the ranch stemmed from the hunting leases under
which hunters used helicopters for a number of game operations,
including deer captures and predator control. Oil Company owned the full
mineral fee estate underlying the property and executed an oil and gas lease
to Lessee. Lessee drilled several wells and paid monthly royalties
to Landowners, after which Landowners entered into a surface use
agreement with Lessee that allowed it to install tank batteries. Lessee
intended to install overhead power lines to generate power to the pump
jacks,
so
it
asked
Landowners
to
sign
an
easement
allowing the installation. Landowners filed a declaratory judgment action
requesting that the trial court declare that Lessee's installation of the
overhead power lines would substantially impair Landowners preexisting
use of the "lateral surface and super-adjacent airspace" of the property,
which included use of the helicopters for game operations. Lessee
counterclaimed, asserting that Landowners were interfering with its right to
extract the minerals by prohibiting the installation of the overhead power
lines. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Landowners and Lessee
appealed. The appellate court held in favor of Landowners, reasoning that
they produced sufficient evidence to meet the elements of the
Accommodation Doctrine. Specifically, Landowners showed that: (1) their
use of the surface and adjacent airspace would be substantially impaired by
the installation of the overhead power lines; (2) there were no reasonable
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alternative methods by which Landowners could continue leasing the ranch
to hunters who managed the property by helicopter; and (3) there was a
reasonable and industry-accepted alternative by which Lessee could power
the pump jacks.
XTO Energy Inc. v. Goodwin, No. 12-16-00068-CV, 2017 WL 4675136
(Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2017).
Lessee failed to pay the proper bonus amount to Lessor, so the lease was
void. Lessee, despite the voided lease, drilled horizontal wells that crossed
Lessor’s property line, pooled the lease with others near it, and paid Lessor,
after he signed a division order, a royalty for his contribution to a pool that
did not include the horizontal well. Lessor sued Lessee for trespass, bad
faith trespass, conversion, fraud, and bad faith pooling. In the trial court, the
jury found that Lessee committed trespass, bad faith trespass, conversion,
and bad faith pooling and denied Lessee’s motion to recover the costs of
paying Lessor the royalty. The appellate court affirmed the finding of
trespass because Lessor had an interest in preventing trespass of any
property at any depth not within the mineral interest, but reversed on the
amount of damages because the calculation was based on unreliable
testimony. It also affirmed the denial of Lessee’s motion to recover the
royalty payment because although Lessor was unjustly enriched, Lessee
was on notice that it did not need to pay Lessor and voluntarily did so. The
appellate court reversed on the issues of bad faith trespass, conversion, and
bad faith pooling. Bad faith trespass was reversed because the jury did not
find malice or fraud prerequisite for bad faith. Bad faith pooling was
reversed because Lessee could not have pooled at all since the lease was
void and the power to pool was based on the lease. Conversion was
reversed because Lessor’s theory of recovery for conversion was based
upon the bad faith pooling, which was reversed.
West Virginia
Kidder v. Montani Energy, LLC, No. 16-1109, 2017 WL 5509927 (W. Va.
Nov. 17, 2017).
Landowners conveyed their property to four of their six children but
excepted oil and gas royalties in the conveyance (“1910 deeds”).
Landowners died intestate and the reserved interest passed to all six
children. Child One and her husband conveyed their interest to Child Two,
but reserved oil and gas royalties in the same way her parents did in their
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initial conveyance. Operator One later acquired oil and gas leases for
portions of the property in dispute. Another party claimed to have
purchased oil and gas rights from Child Two’s interest on a date before
Operator One claims to have gotten any interest. Several operators filed a
“Complaint to Determine Title” in the lower court, and the heirs of Child 1
(“Heirs”) responded to the complaint which Operator One then responded
to. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Operator One
because the 1910 deeds “reserved a royalty interest only, and the oil and gas
ownership rights thus passed with the land conveyance.” Heirs now claim
that: (1) the 1910 deeds reserve royalty interest and “the oil and gas in
place;” and (2) the lower court failed to consider “ownership of all of the oil
and gas that was conveyed in the 1910 deeds.” First, the court found the
1910 deed did not convey the oil and gas in place because a mere
reservation of oil and gas royalties conveys the ownership interest in the oil
and gas and the Landowners did not make clear an intention to reserve the
oil and gas in place. The Heirs’ second argument was dismissed because it
related to a tract of land which Operator One did not request relief for.
Accordingly, summary judgment was affirmed. This is an unpublished
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before
citing the case as precedent.
Wyoming
Bear Peak Res., LLC v. Peak Powder River Res., LLC, 2017 WY 124, 403
P.3d 1033 (Wyo. 2017).
Acquirer and Developer entered into a purchase and sale agreement
(“PSA”) whereby Developer agreed to purchase certain oil and gas interests
owned by Acquirer. The PSA also contained an agreement for procurement
of additional mineral interests within an Area of Mutual Interest (“AMI”)
over a two-year term, which contemplated situations where Acquirer would
purchase interests in the AMI and would then offer Developer the
opportunity to purchase the interests. In 2013, Developer sent two separate
notice letters stating that Acquirer was not performing its obligations based
on reasonable industry standards. In July 2013, Developer notified Acquirer
that Acquirer continued to fail to perform and that the AMI was terminated.
The trial court determined that Developer was entitled to summary
judgment. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part. The court found that the PSA’s plain language was
unambiguous because Developer was able to purchase interests only in
three specified instances and did not allow Developer to purchase interests
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for any reason. The court concluded that the trial court erred when it
determined that Developer properly terminated the AMI. Instead, under the
PSA, the trial court should have considered what the reasonable industry
standards were to determine whether Developer’s dissatisfaction was
“reasonably determined.” The court determined that some interests that
were acquired were after Developer had proposed a well, and, therefore, the
AMI did not apply. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court did
not err when it applied the conventional definition of “proposed a well”
because Acquirer did not offer any evidence to show that “proposed a well”
was a term of art in the industry.
Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, 403 P.3d 997
(Wyo. 2017).
Trustee, a California resident, obtained numerous oil and gas interests in his
lifetime, including an overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) carved from a
federal oil and gas lease located in Wyoming. In his will, Trustee
bequeathed the ORRI, along with all of his oil and gas interests, to his Wife
for life, with the remainder to go to his Foundation. After Trustee’s death, a
California court conducted the probate and granted Wife only the oil and
gas interests but never included the ORRI. Later, a Wyoming court
accepted and adopted the California probate order (“the Order”). Lessee of
the land upon which the oil and gas interest lay sued the Foundation,
claiming ownership of the ORRI. The district court ruled in favor of Lessee,
finding that the Order was a final order and the intent of Trustee was
irrelevant after a final order had been made. Foundation appealed, but the
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the Order was never
appealed and was a final order when it was adopted in Wyoming, thereby
giving its terms effect regarding Wife’s property. Therefore, since the
ORRI was not included in the probate, it passed to Wife in fee simple
instead of a life estate and thus did not pass to Foundation upon Wife’s
death.
Midstream – Federal
Fifth Circuit
Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline, L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2017).
Landowner filed suit against Company for violation of due process in
Company’s natural gas pipeline condemnation. The Fifth Circuit Court of
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Appeals reviewed Company’s motion to dismiss Landowner’s appeal,
finding that Landowner’s appeal was not irrelevant, even though some
construction on the project had begun, because the court could still enforce
some effective relief, restoring the land to its state prior to the
condemnation. Although the lower court cited an Anti-Injunction Act
(“Act”) as support for its refusal to grant an injunction, the court held that
the applicability of such act is questionable in this case. Since in Texas
there are separate processes, administrative and judicial, but those processes
could be thought to merge at some point, there is a question of whether the
Anti-Injunction Act would apply, depending on how the process was
interpreted. The court here declined to determine whether or not the Act
does apply in this case, instead evaluating whether the criteria for granting
an injunction are met. The court determined that these criteria are not met
because Landowner’s constitutional challenge did not hold high likelihood
of success, so it would not meet the necessary requirements for the granting
of an injunction. Further, even though Company’s actions constituted a
“quick taking,” it was nevertheless allowed and not seen as a violation of
due process based on the relevant statute’s history. This is because the
standards in place guiding the requirement that the land be considered
necessary for public use, and the judicial review of such determination,
allow condemnation by Company to move forward, even though it is a
private entity. The court noted that the constitutional challenge might be
more likely to succeed if there was only a private benefit, rather than a
public one, conveyed by the taking, but that was not the case here.
D. District of Columbia
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534
(JEB), 2017 WL 6001726 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017).
Native American tribes (“Tribes”) sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”), claiming improper analysis on the potential environmental
impact of a pipeline crossing underneath a lake which borders the Tribes’
reservations in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”). This court previously refused to stop oil from flowing through
the pipeline because the it found a “‘significant likelihood’ that the Corps
could substantiate its prior conclusions” that did not violate NEPA.
However, this court “left open the possibility of imposing other, interim
conditions during remand [and] ordered further briefing . . . which is now
complete.” Although this court previously decided that it had jurisdiction
“to order interim remedies,” the Corps now argues that the court’s
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conditions on remand go beyond the court’s authority. This court rejected
the Corps’ argument because it mischaracterizes what the Tribes seek as an
injunction—but that is not what the Tribes seek. Because the interim
conditions set out by the court are no more than information-gathering
measures which do not interrupt the remand process, they are within the
court’s lawful authority. What’s more, the court reasoned that recent oil
spills demonstrate that some level of oversight is necessary. As to the
conditions themselves, they are: (1) finalization and implementation of spill
response plans; (2) a third-party audit; and (3) public reporting of pipeline
operations. The first will stand because even though the Corps contends the
parties are themselves carrying out the condition, the court will enforce the
order because “of the case’s history of contested versions of discussions.”
The second condition will stand because it is reasonable to have a thirdparty audit. Finally, the third condition will stand because it is not unduly
burdensome on the pipeline developer which agreed “to ‘voluntarily’ report
on many of the issues raised by the Tribes.”
D. Montana
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dep't of State, No. CV-17-29GF-BMM, 2017 WL 5632435 (D. Mont. Nov. 22, 2017).
After the United States Department of State ("Department") approved and
issued a Presidential Permit to Pipeline Company to construct, connect,
operate, and maintain an 875-mile long pipeline across the border of the
United States, Organization challenged the decision to issue the Presidential
Permit, seeking for Department to withdraw its approval of the pipeline and
Presidential Permit until Pipeline Company has complied with National
Environmental
Policy
Act
(“NEPA”). Department
moved
to
dismiss Organization's complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
present a cause of action; it also argued that the issuance of a Presidential
Permit by a federal agency pursuant to an Executive Order constitutes
Presidential action immune from judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). Here, the court held that the Department's
regulations would require a NEPA review. The court also looked at
whether Organization lacked standing due to vague allegations regarding
adverse environmental and cultural impacts from the pipeline, and for
failing to allege a sufficient concrete interest in listed species that would be
harmed. The court analyzed whether Organization established: (1) injuryin-fact; (2) plausible connection between Department's conduct and
Organization's injury; and (3) redressability, holding that Department's
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motions to dismiss were denied, and Organization's motions to dismiss
were also denied.
D. North Dakota
Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-007, 2017 WL 4532581 (D.N.D.
Oct. 10, 2017).
Developer of a pipeline (“Company 1”) hired Company 2 (together,
“Companies”) to contact Landowners to negotiate easements. Landowners
make four claims against the Companies: (1) Company 1 violated North
Dakota law by using “unfair tactics in acquiring land easements;” (2)
Company 1 committed fraud; (3) Company 2 committed fraud; and (4) the
Companies committed civil conspiracy. Landowners claim that Company 2
represented, among other things, to them that if they signed easement
agreements, they would get a twenty percent signing bonus, but if they
refused to sign the Landowners would get little if anything in eminent
domain proceedings. Landowners further allege that they signed the
easement agreements because of the representations made by Company 2
and that other landowners received more money for easements. The court
disagrees with the Landowners’ two fraud claims for three reasons. First,
Landowners do not meet heightened particularity standard because their
amended complaint only refers to agents or employees of the Companies—
not individual names—nor does it include times when negotiations
occurred or by what means any conversation took place. Second, the fraud
is not actionable in North Dakota because alleged factual statements were
all contingent on future events. Third, any statements made outside of the
contract itself could not be relied upon because of the easement contracts’
integration clause. The Companies also did not violate North Dakota law by
using unfair tactics in acquiring easements because all of the alleged
statements are merely sales talk and puffery, not misrepresentation,
deception, fraud, or something else required by statute. Finally,
Landowners’ civil conspiracy argument fails because “there is not an
actionable underlying tort claim to support the civil conspiracy claim.”
Company 2’s motion to dismiss and Company 1’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings are both granted. This case has since been appealed, but there
is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
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E.D. Michigan
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. 0.4 Acres +/- Permanent Easement and
0.8 +/- Temporary Easement of Land in August Township, Washtenaw
County, Michigan, Case No. 17-cv-13220, 2017 WL 4778727 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 23, 2017).
Company brought a condemnation act seeking an easement over
Landowner’s property. The court granted Company’s motion for summary
judgment finding: (1) the Federal Energy Regulation Commission
(“FERC”) issued a certificate of public service and necessity to Company
authorizing the pipeline; (2) the use of the easement is necessary for the
construction of the project; and (3) Company cannot acquire the easement
by contract if it cannot come to an agreement with the owners on
compensation. The court granted Company’s partial summary judgment
because Company had a valid certificate of public convenience and
necessity issued by FERC pursuant to the Natural Gas Act. The court also
granted Company’s preliminary injunctive relief for three reasons. First,
Company won on the partial summary judgment which waves heavily in
favor of granting the injunction. Second, court found irreparable harm
where a gas company needed to proceed construction of pipeline where
construction delays could add costs to the project. Third, it would not cause
substantial harm to Landowners.
M.D. Pennsylvania
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres,
Permanent Overlay Easement for 1.709 Acres and Temporary Easement for
8.551 Acres in Milford and Westfall Townships, Pike County Pennsylvania,
No. 3:12-CV-01477, 2017 WL 4954093 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2017).
Pipeline Company filed a complaint in condemnation of property on July
31, 2012 seeking to acquire a permanent easement and temporary
easements on properties owned by Landowner. Pipeline Company owned
an existing permanent easement of varying width across the property. On
October 2, a Stipulated Order was entered granting the right to access, and
Pipeline Company immediately adhered to the stipulation therein and took
access and possession of the rights of way. The action was administratively
reopened, and the parties participated in discovery. The court granted in
part and denied in part Pipeline Company’s motion for summary judgment
on August 30, 2017. On September 21, 2017, Landowners filed a motion
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requesting the Memorandum and Order from the most recent decision be
certified to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for an interlocutory appeal.
The court determined that this case was of such an unsettled nature and so
recurrent in the court, that it was the type of “exceptional case” that
warrants an interlocutory appeal and granted the motion.
N.D. Florida
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. +/- 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cty.,
Florida, No. 1:16CV93-MW/GRJ, 2017 WL 5494552 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15,
2017).
In 2016, the court granted Pipeline Company’s motion for partial summary
judgment as to its right to condemn an easement through Landowners’
property to build a natural gas pipeline. Pipeline Company took possession
and began and ended construction of the pipeline within a year’s time. The
activities caused a great deal of emotional pain and destroyed several
mature live oak trees on the property during construction, prevented
Landowners from leasing pasture to cattle farmers, and prevented
Landowners from planting more profitable crops. Pipeline Company
brought the issue to the court to determine whether these kinds of losses
may be compensated and moved for partial summary judgment. The court
determined that the use of eminent domain decreased the value of
Landowners’ land and caused Landowners to not be able to plant
watermelon in the affected fields. Landowners would have had a higher net
income despite the construction, so the court denied Pipeline Company’s
summary judgment motion as to the issue of crop-income losses.
Additionally, the court denied the balance outlined in Pipeline Company’s
motion as a jury may consider evidence of lost grazing fees and watermelon
crop income losses in determining full compensation. However, the court
granted the motion for partial summary judgment to the extent that
Landowners sought compensation for the separate appraisal value of each
oak tree and Landowners were permitted to present evidence of severance
damages resulting from the loss of the trees.
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Midstream – State
Louisiana
Chauvin v. Shell Oil Co., 16-609 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), No. 16-CA609, 2017 WL 4800236.
Landowners’ descendants (“Descendants”), after learning of their possible
ownership, brought suit alleging trespass and damages caused by oil and
gas pipelines installed on land. Oil and Gas Company (“Company”), along
with several others who were granted servitudes over the property, filed a
motion for summary judgment claiming that Company had purchased the
land from Landowners. The district court granted the motion and
Descendants appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for
several reasons. First, both parties’ surveyors concluded that the property
which Company purchased from Landowners included that which the
pipelines now extend. Second, if Landowners had believed that they still
owned some of the property, they would have bequeathed it to their heirs as
they did with other real property. Third, the actions by Company on the
property and the non-actions taken by Landowners suggest that parties
intended Company to acquire ownership of the property. Finally,
Company’s ownership was further established by acquisitive prescription
because they had satisfied the requirements for ownership via thirty years
of possession.
Mississippi
Elmore v. Dixie Pipeline Co., No. 2015-CA-01499-COA, 2017 WL
4386686 (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).
Operator operated a pipeline in which liquid propane was transported. The
pipeline was constructed in 1961 and was manufactured using a lowfrequency electric resistance welding (“ERW”) process. In the late 1980’s,
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(“Administration”) issued an alert notice to all hazardous-liquid propane
operators who used ERW pipelines and advised them of the pipelines’
operational failures. The notices contained recommendations by the
Administration but did not require the operators to cease operation or
remove and replace the pipes. In 2007, Operator’s pipeline ruptured, and
some propane vaporized and exploded. Landowner claimed that his house
suffered structural damage from the shockwaves. Landowner sued Operator
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for negligence, strict liability, and punitive damages. The National
Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) investigated the rupture and
concluded that no defects or anomalies existed and that the rupture was not
a result of corrosion, excavation damage, the controller’s actions, or the
operating conditions of the pipeline. Operator moved for summary
judgment. The lower court granted its motion as to the strict-liability and
punitive damages claims. Operator later renewed its motion for summary
judgment on the negligence claim after Landowner’s expert witness’s
testimony was excluded. The court granted the motion, and Landowner
appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the transportation of
liquid propane was not considered an ultrahazardous activity and, therefore,
was not subject to strict liability. Additionally, based on the NTSB’s
determinations, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the
pipeline would not have ruptured had Operator used proper care.
Pennsylvania
Foster II v. Dickson, No. 1553 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 4679749 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Oct. 18, 2017).
Brother sued Sister in a dispute over future payments stemming from gas
pipeline operations. Their Parents, original owners of several tracts of land,
entered into a right of way agreement with an energy company. In the
agreement, Parents conveyed to the energy company a right of way and
easement along a specified route to install gas pipelines. Later, Parents
conveyed their land to Sister, by deed, granting all surface rights and
payments for surface use and damages, reserving however to the parents
one-half of all future payments for the placement of right of ways and/or
pipelines across the land. Immediately after this conveyance to Sister, the
parents assigned to Brother all of their one-half undivided interest in and to
future payments for the placement of right of ways and/or pipelines across
the property. The energy company later installed a pipeline, paid one-half
the consideration to Sister, but withheld the remaining half of the
consideration from Brother. Brother filed suit for declaratory judgment,
claiming that he was entitled to the funds as they represented fifty percent
(“50%”) payment for placement of right-of-ways and pipelines on the
property. Sister claimed she was entitled to the remaining proceeds as they
were payments simply for “surface use and damages.” Trial court entered
judgment for Brother and Sister appealed. The appellate court affirmed,
reasoning that the deed explicitly stated that Parents reserved 50% of the
amount received for the placement of pipelines on or across the property in
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the future. By the plain meaning of the language in the deed, the court
continued, Parents and Sister were to split equally the payment for new
pipelines, and thereafter the assignment grants to Brother any interest that
would go to the parents. Thus, Brother was entitled to 50% of the total
amount as the trial court determined.
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipelines L.P., No. 1780 C.D. 2016, 2017
WL 4783584 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017).
Transporter sought to condemn a permanent easement, a temporary
workspace easement, a permanent road easement, a permanent block valve
easement, and a fenced-in block valve site for the construction and
operation of a portion of its pipeline project. Condemnee objected to the
condemnation and alleged that it violated state law regarding eminent
domain. The trial court overruled Condemnee’s objections. Condemnee
appealed, raising several issues including: (1) whether Transporter’s
pipeline was needed to meet the state’s natural gas liquids demand; (2)
whether state public utility commission’s procedures unconstitutionally
excluded landowners impacted by the pipeline; (3) whether there was a
trustee of the state’s natural resources for the pipeline; and (4) whether the
trial court abused its discretion by not holding excessive taking and bond
sufficiency hearings. In analyzing the public need, the court addressed
Transporter’s status as a public utility and the nature of the pipeline project.
The court agreed with previous cases dealing with the same pipeline
company which found that Transporter, a private company, may exercise
eminent domain since it had been certified a public utility by the court.
Furthermore, due to procedural timing issues, the court held that
Condemnee had waived its claims regarding landowner exclusion, lack of
notice, its natural resources trustee claim, and its excessive takings claim.
However, the court found that the trial court should have held a bond
sufficiency hearing before overruling Condemnee’s objections and
remanded the issue back to the trial court. This is an unpublished opinion of
the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
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Downstream
10th Circuit
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 874 F.3d 1159
(10th Cir. 2017).
Congress issued an amendment to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 2005 that
directed the EPA to operate a Renewable Fuel Standards Program
(“Program”) in order to increase the use of renewable fuels by oil refineries;
however, Congress added an exception for small oil refineries. For small
refineries that would suffer a “disproportionate economic hardship,” EPA
was required to grant exemptions from the Program on a case-by-case basis.
In a study conducted by the Department of Energy (“DOE”), Operator was
considered to be a small refinery to which the Program would cause such
hardship. In evaluating the petitions for exemption from the Program, EPA
was required to consult with DOE and consider the findings of the study
DOE had conducted. Operator petitioned for an exemption from the
Program, but EPA denied the petition because it determined that Operator
was profitable enough to pay the Program’s cost. Operator sought review
from the court. The court determined that, according to EPA,
“disproportionate economic hardship” meant a threat to the existence of the
small refinery or a significant threat to the operation of the business.
However, the court concluded that a plain meaning of “disproportionate
economic hardship” was required. The court determined that the definition
should be one that makes the businesses life difficult to continue and
financially sustain. The court concluded that “an experience that causes
hardship is less burdensome than an experience that threatens one’s very
existence.” EPA’s definition was too strict, too narrow, and it was
completely at odds with Congress’s statutory command. Therefore, the
court held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority and vacated EPA’s
decision.
Louisiana
Cormier v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 2017-104 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/4/17);
228 So.3d 770.
Oil Refinery Workers (“Workers”) filed personal injury suit against Oil
Company alleging exposure to slop oil after spill at facility. The district
court found in favor of Workers and awarded damages. Oil Company
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appealed the amount of the award, alleging that the district court abused its
discretion because the awards were much higher than those given in similar
cases. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the amount of damages,
holding that although the awards were on the high end for the particular
injuries suffered, they did not amount to an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. The court also held that the awards were not grossly disproportionate
to the medical expenses incurred by Workers because, due to the nature of
the injuries sustained, medical expenses in their case would be low
compared to the general damages suffered by Workers.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
9th Circuit
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 874 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.
2017).
Environmental Organization filed suit against Utility Company under the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Resource
Conversation Recovery Act (“RCRA”). It alleged that Utility Company had
disregarded toxic wood treatment chemicals at its facility. The district court
granted Utility Company summary judgment on RCRA claim. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and
remanded in part. RCRA is an environmental statute that governs treatment,
storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. It allows for private
enforcement through citizen action. The endangerment provision does not
require private citizen to prove any specific violation of RCRA
requirements. The court held that there was no evidence that Utility
Company’s trucks picked up contaminants on their trips and carried them
offsite. court held that the district court erred in applying the RCRA antiduplication provision. The abuse of the CWA permit did not trigger
RCRA’s anti-duplication provision. Utility Company failed to provide legal
requirements to show why permits were necessary. The court reversed the
district court’s summary judgment on Utility Company and the denial of
Environmental Organization’s arguments regarding storm water and
remanded to consider the Environmental Organization’s storm water
pathway and solid waste. It affirmed the partial summary judgment on the
tire-tracking pathway.
Navajo Nation v. Dep't. of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017).
A federally recognized Indian Tribe (“Tribe”), living in parts of Arizona,
New Mexico, and Utah relies heavily on the Colorado River waters,
considering that most of its lands are "of the desert kind." It was previously
held in Arizona v. California, where the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the vitality of the Winters doctrine – reserving water rights for
federal lands –, and that water from the Colorado River was essential to the
life of the tribes, their people, the animals they hunted, and the crops they
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raised. The Decree awarded five tribes a right to Lower Basin water but
declined to reach the claims of the twenty other tribes, one being
Tribe. Since this Decree, Tribe has repeatedly asserted its right to water in
the Lower Colorado but these rights have not yet been recognized. Tribe
filed its initial complaint against Department of the Interior (“DOI”),
alleging that DOI failed to adequately consider and protect Tribe’s rights to
water, thus violating the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). The
district court dismissed Tribe’s claims, finding that the alleged harm to
Nation’s unrecognized Winters rights was too speculative to confer
standing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal,
reasoning that Tribe could not show that harm to its concrete interests—
here, its possible Winters rights—was reasonably probable. It also held that
the alleged adverse effect on Tribe's generalized interest in availability of
water did not show that Tribe suffered injury required for Article III
standing.
United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2017).
Developer appealed his conviction in district court for violating the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) by: (1) knowingly, and without a permit, discharging
dredged material from a point source into a United States water source; and
(b) willfully injured United States’ property by constructing a series of
ponds on both National Forest System Lands and on privately owned
mining land. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld his conviction,
holding that: (1) the test for determining whether creek and wetlands into
which Developer discharged dredges material is subject to the CWA
whether or not there was a significant nexus between them and the
navigable waters in the traditional sense; (2) Developer had fair warning
that without a permit his conduct was considered criminal; (3) for expert
witness testimony it did not matter if the expert used the binding regulations
or the enforcement guidelines; (4) the ordinary high water mark was
properly considered by the expert witness in evaluating whether the
material was dredge material being disposed of; (5) the exclusion of the
Army Corps of Engineers manual was not an abuse of discretion by the
court; and (6) it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the study looking
at existing contamination.
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10th Circuit
City of Eudora v. Rural Water Dist. No. 4, Douglas Cty., Kansas, 875 F.3d
1030 (10th Cir. 2017).
Water District and City disagreed as to which entity could provide water
services to particular areas in the county. Water District had to obtain
financing to expand and to ensure water services to all parts of its service
area; at approximately the same time, City annexed the Water District’s
service area. Under state law, a municipality replaces a rural water district
after annexation. However, Water District believed that if it restructured its
financing to include a federally-guaranteed loan, it would receive federal
protection that would prevent City from assuming its water customers while
the USDA loan was in repayment. This case addressed the third appeal to
determine who is entitled to provide water service to the disputed service
area. City sought declaration from the court that it may provide water
service to the annexed area without violating Water District’s rights after
the reaffirmation. The district court again found for City, because even
under its new strategy of obtaining federal protection, Water District did not
meet the requirements set forth in subsequent cases dealing with this matter.
Water District appealed, claiming that City’s action was barred by res
judicta, that City’s action was barred by the rule against claim-splitting, and
that its new legal and financial structure of the federally-guaranteed loan
provided them with the requirements under state law to receive federal
protection. The court noted that Water District’s arguments for res judicta
would only be successful if all claim preclusion requirements were met.
The court determined that the reaffirmation of the loan’s guarantee did not
constitute a separate transaction for claim preclusion purposes.
Additionally, the court found that Water District’s other claims were
without merit and irrelevant.
Federal Claims
Baley v. United States, No. 1-591L, 2017 WL 4342771 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29,
2017).
Class of Farmers (“Class”) sued the Federal Government following
termination of water and water delivery service out of precaution to respect
certain tribal rights and to adhere to the Endangered Species Act. Following
a trial, several substantive issues remained. First, the court determined that
Federal Government’s motion for summary judgment against shareholders

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4

2018]

Recent Case Decisions

1245

of a company that contracted with for purposes of water delivery should be
granted. The motion was granted because of a previous order by this court
which bars claims of those shareholders. In that order, this court determined
that the shareholders’ claims are barred because their interests are only
derivative of the company’s water rights instead of being beneficial water
rights of their own. Therefore, the shareholders’ claims were dismissed.
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether the Government’s actions
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Those remaining plaintiffs
who claimed water rights through Warren Act contracts or lease agreements
for land in the National Wildlife Refuge did not have an actionable takings
claim because those agreements changed the water rights of those people in
such a way that they cannot seek compensation against the Government.
The remaining class members did, however, demonstrate a sufficient
interest in property over the water because they were not subject to the
same contractual terms. However, of those remaining class members, none
were capable of recovering on the basis of a Takings Clause claim because
several tribes had superior water rights when the Government terminated
water delivery service. This case has since been appealed, but there is no
decision from the higher court as of publication.
Jackson v. United States, Nos. 14–397L/15–194L, 2017 WL 5586679 (Fed.
Cl. Nov. 20, 2017).
Property Owners sued Government alleging that a taking had occurred
when the Surface Transportation Board issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use
or Abandonment pursuant to the National Trails System Act. Property
Owners argued that the prior landowners granted easements to the Middle
Georgia & Atlantic Railway for the sole purpose of operating a railroad,
and that the property reverted back to the Property Owners in fee simple
once the easements were no longer being used for railroad operations. The
court found that the easements were not broad enough to encompass trail
use, thus siding with Property Owners and granting their motion for
summary judgment, returning the property in fee simple to them.
Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, No. 04–786 L, 2017 WL
5029063 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 3, 2017).
Ranching Group filed a complaint against United States Forest Service
(“USFS”) for an adjudication of its right to beneficial use of stock water
sources within the Sacramento Allotment of the Lincoln National Forest
that pre-dated federal control. USFS had installed enclosures that limited
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the use of stock water resources. The court determined that: (1) Ranching
Group’s Fifth Amendment Taking Clause claims were not barred by the
statute of limitations; (2) Ranching Group had established a property
interest, recognized by New Mexico law, in making beneficial use of stock
water resources in the Lincoln National Forest; and (3) Ranching Group’s
right to make beneficial use of stock water was abrogated by actions
undertaken by the USFS in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.
St. Bernard Parish Gov't v. United States, No. 15-637C, 2017 WL4675686
(Fed. Cl. Oct. 18, 2017).
On June 30, 2017, United States entered into an Agreement with Parish
which provided that under the provisions of the Emergency Watershed
Protection Program (“EWP”), United States was authorized to assist Parish
in relieving hazards created by natural disasters that cause sudden
impairment in a watershed. It also stated that the parties agreed to install
emergency watershed protection measures to relieve hazards and damages
created by Hurricane Katrina. In this action, Parish alleged that United
States breached the Agreement by not paying it all the money it was due for
the removal of sediment in the bayou in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. United States moved to dismiss the action, arguing that because the
Agreement was not a contract but rather a “Cooperative Agreement” under
the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act (“FGCAA”), or
alternatively that because the Agreement lacked consideration on the part
of United States, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court held that the
Agreement was to be considered a cooperative agreement and,
therefore, Parish lacked jurisdiction in the court under the Tucker Act. It
reasoned that not only was the Agreement labeled “Cooperative
Agreement,” but that Parish was unable to point to any specific provision in
the Agreement contemplating money damages for breach by United
States. The court also noted that there was no consideration that rendered a
benefit to United States, so the Agreement was not an enforceable contract
in the court. This case has since been appealed, but there is no ruling from
the higher court as of publication.
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D. Arizona
Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. CV-15-00448-PHX-JJT,
2017 WL 4364108 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2017).
Utility Company filed a motion for partial summary judgement. Irrigation
District sought judicial review regarding its contract to determine if it had
the “right to pump ground water from its East Side Wells and transport the
water for [its] use … does not terminate on October 26, 2020.” The court
denied Utility Company’s motion for partial summary judgment and
granted part of RID’s motion and denied part of it. Where the United States
is a party, federal law governs the interpretation of such contracts.
Contracts should be read as a whole, and extrinsic evidence of trade usage
and course dealing may be considered when there is an ambiguity. The
court looked at the plain language of the contract to determine the length of
the contractual term. The court determined that the language of the contract
was ambiguous regarding the contractual length of term. The court further
determined that since it was ambiguous and extrinsic evidence could be
support by each party that a determination should be made at trial. Utility
Company contends that the contract requires the water Irrigation District
receives distrusted in compliance with the “‘Warren Act’ which limit the
use of waters pumped from United States Reclamation Service Projects to
160 acres for any one land owner.” The court found Irrigation District
failed to show a lack of genuine dispute regarding facts of Irrigation
District’s right to pump under the contract beyond the date and that the
length of the contract must go to trial. The court also noted that the contract
at issue is not a Warrant Act contract, because no dispute existed as to the
Secretary of the Interior as a non-party to the agreement. However, the
court noted that a genius dispute existed as to the extent of which the parties
incorporated terms of the Warrant Act. This is an unpublished opinion of
the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
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State
Arizona
Henline v. Gregg, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0524, 2017 WL 4638258 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Oct. 17, 2017).
Members belonged to Water Co–Op, a co-operative association formed to
supply water to an eighty-acre tract of land around a well in County.
Members of Water Co-Op acquire interests therein proportionate to the
number of acres they own; the Water Co-Op itself owns the well and water
distribution equipment. Members conveyed Water Co-Op-property to
Grantee through quitclaim and warranty deeds; however, neither of these
deeds granted Grantee membership to Water Co-Op. Grantee later erected a
fence around his property that blocked Members’ access to a north-south
road, an east-west road, and to Water Co-Op equipment. Members sued to
quiet title and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and
permanent injunctions to enjoin Grantee from blocking the roads. Members
also sought a declaration that they were entitled to easements along the
roads and that Grantee was not a member of Water Co-Op. Grantee
counterclaimed, alleging that he was entitled to water from Water Co-Op
because he acquired the land through a warranty deed from a Member of
Water Co-Op and that membership ran with the land. The lower court
found that Grantee must provide access to Water Co-Op equipment and was
prohibited from interfering with the equipment. It also granted summary
judgment to Members, holding that Grantee was not a Water Co-Op
member and that the Members had a prescriptive easement for use of the
roads because they had used them for more than ten years. Grantee
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that neither of the deeds
awarded Grantee membership, and the prescriptive easement that belonged
to Members prohibited Grantee from blocking roads on his land. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
California
City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist., 406 P.3d
733 (Cal. 2017).
City brought suit seeking writs of mandate and administrative mandate
along with reverse validation and declaratory relief against Water
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Conservation District (“District”), challenging the constitutionality of
District’s groundwater pumping charges to City and other operators for
certain consolidated water years. District cross-claimed, seeking a
declaratory judgment to uphold its charge. The district court issued a
declaratory judgment and the writs of mandate, ordering District to refund
City for certain years of charges. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court
of California held that District’s groundwater charges fell outside the
purview of Article IIID of the California Constitution as they were not
“imposed . . . upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property
ownership” within that phrase’s constitutional meaning, because in
executing the groundwater pumping, District was not providing a service to
City in its capacity as owner of the lands where the groundwater wells were
located, but rather in its capacity as an extractor of groundwater from areas
managed for the public’s benefit. The court determined that because
District’s charge qualified as one imposed for a specific benefit given
directly to the payor that is not given to those not charged, and because the
charge did not exceed reasonable costs to the local government for
conferring the benefit or privilege, the charge was exempt from the
Constitutional definition of a “tax.” On that question, the court remanded
the issue with instructions to examine the record for evidence that the
charges in question carried a “reasonable relationship to the benefits of its
conservation activities” as is constitutionally required.
Living Rivers Council v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 703
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Objector filed petition for writ of mandate to require Water Resources
Control Board (“Board”) to rescind its approval of policy designed to
maintain instream flows in certain coastal streams. The trial court denied
the petition and Objector appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding
that a revised substitute environmental document was not misleading with
respect to whether policy-induced increases in groundwater use would
cause significant impacts; that such document adequately described
subterranean stream delineations as potential, but unadopted, mitigation
measure; and evidence was sufficient to support finding that subterranean
stream delineations were infeasible as mitigation measure. This case was
ordered not published; therefore, state court rules should be consulted
before citing the case as precedent.
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Pleasant Valley Cty. Water Dist. v. Fox Canyon Groundwater Mgt. Agency,
No. 2d Civil No. B281425, 2017 WL 5589178 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
2017).
Water District sued groundwater management agency (“Agency”), seeking
to invalidate an ordinance clarifying the rules for groundwater extraction
surcharges (“Ordinance”). Agency was created to address groundwater
overdrafts with the objective of balancing water supply and demand. Water
District is a water purveyor and is a special district with its acreage all
within land under Agency’s authority. Ordinance was created in response to
the Governor’s 2014 declaration of a statewide drought emergency and
sought to clarify which water sources are subject to a groundwater
surcharge if not used efficiently by an agricultural operator. Water District
contended that Agency lacked the statutory authority to consider river
surface water use in calculating the groundwater extraction surcharge. The
trial court found Agency’s ordinance as not exceeding its lawmaking
authority and that the ordinance is categorically exempt from California
Environmental Quality Act and does not violate the equal protection clause
of the California constitution. Because the state legislature granted Agency
with broad authority in adopting ordinances to preserve, protect, and
enhance groundwater resources as well as the authority to implement
conjunctive use objectives for groundwater management, the appellate
court held that Agency’s control is not limited to only groundwater basins.
While Agency was not primarily created to monitor river surface water use,
the appellate court found the activity to be within the grant of Agency’s
expressed and implied powers. In regard to the equal protection claim, the
appellate court held that Water District failed to show how Ordinance
treated Water District differently from similarly situated persons and that
Agency had a rational basis for determinations based on the source of
groundwater used for irrigation. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Monterey Coastkeeper v. Monterey Cty. Water Res. Agency, 226 Cal. Rptr.
3d 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Program filed a petition for writ of mandate against Agency, claiming five
causes of action. Program claimed that Agency violated the local PorterCologne Water Quality Control Act (“Act”) by discharging waste into local
water sources without filing a report on such discharge. Program also
claimed violations by failure to comply with the Act’s requirements
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regarding the waste discharge itself, and the water quality plan. Program
also claimed that Agency breached its fiduciary and public duty through
such actions and created a public nuisance. Since the State Water Board had
already begun an investigation, but with no final action taken, the court
relied on their information, determining that Agency was in fact a waste
discharger. The court held that there was an administrative remedy which
should have been pursued before filing petition for writ of mandate.
Program could have asked the Regional Water Board to step in, as it is
authorized to do under the Act, and order Agency to file the required
discharge report, imposing civil repercussions if such an order was not
complied with. The state and regional water boards have direct authority to
manage water quality and waste discharge, so the grievance should have
started with them, not the court system. However, the court found that the
Act does allow for judicial review, despite Agency’s claim otherwise,
because even though the State Water Board’s review of the Regional Water
Board’s decision is discretionary, their denial of review triggers further
judicial review. According to the record, Program never filed a petition
requesting the State Water Board’s review of the Regional Water Board’s
inaction. Thus, this court held that Program could not get “extraordinary
relief” because it had not expended all administrative remedies.
Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Cty. of Ventura Envtl. Health Div., 225
Cal. Rptr. 3d 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
In November 2014, an explosion at Operator’s facility led to a criminal
investigation in which Health Division assisted in executing a search
warrant. Health Division discovered nineteen 275-gallon totes and seven
50-gallon drums of Petromax and determined that twenty-four of the totes
and drums were hazardous because their high pH levels had accumulated
over time. Because the district attorney’s office (“DA”) had already filed a
criminal action against Operator, Health Division chose to use an informal
enforcement action, which notifies the operator of noncompliance and puts
in place an action and date for the correction, but it does not impose any
sanctions. Operator sued Health Division arguing that Petromax was not
hazardous waste and that it had a right to an administrative hearing to
determine whether Petromax constituted hazardous waste. Health Division
filed a motion to strike the petition as a “strategic lawsuit against public
participation” (“Anti-SLAPP”). The trial court denied the motion. The
appeals court reversed the denial, holding that Health Division made a
prima facie showing that Operator’s cause of action arose from an act of
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free speech in connection with a public issue and that Operator failed to
carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim.
Idaho
Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 406 P.3d 878 (Idaho 2017).
Landowners filed suit seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment
against Irrigation District for diverting a portion of their water source to
other property owners in the district. The district court granted District’s
motion to dismiss on all counts—count I, which sought a declaratory
judgment enforcing Landowners’ water rights, and count III, which sought
injunctive relief for breach of fiduciary duty, were dismissed for lack of
justiciability, and count II, which challenged the project’s assessment as a
violation of Landowners’ property rights, was dismissed as being barred by
res judicata. Landowners appealed, arguing that: (1) the legal standard used
by the lower court in granting dismissal was improper, and (2) neither
justiciability nor res judicata barred their claims. The Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the determination that counts I and II were not justiciable because
their claim that District’s project will cause “dilution” of Landowners’
available water supply did not constitute an actual or threatened injury to
Landowners. However, the court reversed and remanded the lower court’s
decision to dismiss Landowners’ claim for declaratory relief on procedural
grounds.
Montana
In re Scott Ranch, LLC, 2017 MT 230, 388 Mont. 509, 402 P.3d 1207.
This water rights case involves tribal lands allotted to a deceased party,
later converted to fee simple and procured by Purchaser. Purchaser sought
associated water rights, but was denied by the Water Court because the
court determined that the rights were preexisting, originating from the Crow
Water Rights Compact, were exempt because they were for “livestock or
individual use” and therefore required no adjudication. The Water Court
said Purchaser could share in the collective allotted share of the Tribal
Water Rights. On review, the Montana Supreme Court determined that
these rights are ‘existing rights’ under the relevant statute because “[a]s the
non-Indian successor-in-interest to allotment lands conveyed by a tribal
member, [Purchaser] possesses Walton water rights as appurtenances to the
lands it acquired.” Walton rights are non-tribal members’ “right[s] to share
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in reserved waters.” However, the court held that the claims fell under the
jurisdiction of state law, rather than Tribal Water Rights, since the water
rights were obtained through the allocation of the converted land, not as
part of the Crow Compact which created the shared rights. Additionally, the
land was purchased by a private party and no longer held via trust by the
government. Even though a claim filing deadline (that had long passed) was
imposed by state law, it would have been impossible for Purchaser to
comply with such a deadline, considering the date of sale. Therefore, the
court reversed and remanded the claims, finding that the Water Court erred
in deciding that these rights were still part of the collective Tribal Water
Rights. It also offered instructions that Purchaser may still submit a claim,
despite the past deadline.
Quigley, 2017 MT 278, 389 Mont. 283, 405 P.3d 627 (Mont. 2017).
Landowner and Neighbor brought suit against one another, asserting
conflicting claims of ownership over irrigation water rights. Water Master
based a report dividing the four rights on proportional ownership rights of
the irrigated acres owned by each party. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Montana after the Water Court largely adopted Water
Master’s report. Landowner contend that Water Master and the Water Court
erred in failing to interpret a past decree to only include water rights where
Neighbor put the water to beneficial use. The Montana Supreme Court
ultimately held that Neighbor’s pleadings do not control the place of use of
the rights decreed to Neighbor. The court affirmed the Water Court’s order.
Nevada
Bosta v. King, 404 P.3d 397 (Nev. Oct. 13, 2017).
The district court denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed water
rights owners’ (“Owners”) complaint in a water rights action. On appeal,
Owners argued that State Engineer lacked authority to regulate well usage
because: (1) percolating groundwater is private property, under which water
lies; and (2) even if percolating groundwater was not private property,
Owners were not “persons” within the meaning of the relevant state law. In
response, the Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with both contentions,
finding that: (1) the Legislature, in the 1939 Water Act, determined
percolating groundwater as belonging to the public; and (2) state law at
issue does not expressly prove a separate definition of “person,” but instead
expands another provision’s general definition of “person,” which owners
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fall under. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the
decision of the district court. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state or federal court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
State Eng’r v. Eureka Cty., 402 P.3d 1249 (Nev. 2017).
Company filed many applications to amend the water usage in Valley. The
State Engineer granted Company’s application. The State Engineer noted
that the ruling would impact some of the senior water rights but that
Company would be able to mitigate the impact. Company still had to
prepare a monitoring, management, and mitigation plan before diverting the
water. The County’s request for a judicial review was denied. Company and
State Engineer argue that the district court exceeded its authority when it
vacated the permits rather than remanding the case for further fact-finding.
The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed. The court stated that when it
remands a case, “the district court ‘must proceed in accordance with the
mandate and the law of the case as established on appeal.’” The court
determined that State Engineer’s determination that Company could
mitigate the preexisting water was not based on substantial evidence and
therefore could not stand. At no point did the court direct the district court
to remand the case for further fact-finding. Therefore, the district court
acted consistent within the instructions of the Supreme Court of Nevada.
The court affirmed the lower court because it complied with the direction of
the Supreme Court of Nevada.
New York
Vill. of Woodbury v. Seggos, 65 N.Y.S.3d 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Village had been building a thirteen-mile long pipeline to tap into an
aqueduct. Because authorization to withdraw water would not be granted
unless Village proved that it had an adequate backup water source, Village
acquired property in neighboring town (“Town”) that was suitable for a
needed pump station and provided access to an abundant potential water
supply. Village then applied to the Department of Environmental
Conservation (“DEC”) for a permit to develop a well field at the Town.
Village’s application was reviewed under the State Environmental Quality
Review Act (“SEQRA”), and no adverse environmental impact was found.
The water supply permit was further submitted and reviewed by DEC, and
Village was issued a final permit in 2015. Interest Groups brought two
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different claims seeking relief, including annulment of the water withdrawal
permit and an injunction barring the withdrawal. DEC and Village moved
to dismiss both claims on grounds that Intervenors lacked standing. The
trial court found that the Intervenors lacked standing to bring the suit and
further noted that even those parties’ challenges to the SEQRA
determination were barred by res judicata and belied by “overwhelming
documentary evidence,” and dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed for several of the Intervenors, but held those that
were neighboring landowners and towns had standing to sue, but that the
SEQRA challenge was time-barred, and the DEC had rational basis for
granting the permit application and acted within its discretion in doing so.
Ohio
State ex rel. Dewine v. Osborne Co., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-091, 2017
WL 4779213 (Oct. 23, 2017).
State sued Operator alleging three causes of action; each alleged a violation
of State’s Water Pollution Control Laws. State claimed that: (1) Operator
failed to obtain certification from State’s EPA before engaging in certain
activities along the river; (2) that Operator failed to obtain a construction
storm water discharge permit before engaging in activities that disturbed the
land along the river; and (3) that Operator polluted the river, without a
permit, by discharging storm water into the river. Operator had been
placing dredged material into the river, degraded certain portions of the
river, and threatened other portions in order to increase water flow.
Operator was also removing material from the center of the river and
placing it on the water banks. The trial court found Operator personally
liable. Operator appealed bringing four assignments of error. First, that the
trial court wrongly interpreted that all of the work performed was without a
permit; secondly and thirdly, that the trial court erred in assessing a civil
penalty and awarding State injunctive relief beyond the scope necessary;
and lastly, that the trial court erred in finding Operator personally liable.
Resolving the first assignment of error, the appeals court found that while
Operator’s actions violated other statutory provisions, State did not allege
those provisions. The court remanded Operator’s second and third
assignments of error based on the court’s resolution of the first assignment
of error. Finally, the court held that the fourth assignment of error was
without merit, because under State law, an individual may be held
personally liable when the court finds “personal participation” in the
unlawful act.
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Oregon
Willamette Water Co. v. Waterwatch of Or., Inc., 407 P.3d 923 (Or. Ct.
App. 2017).
Company applied for a permit to use public water for a quasi-public use.
Commission proposed a conditional permit which Public Interest Group
protested. An ALJ heard arguments and denied the application because the
applicable law stated that projects to divert public water must be completed
within five years of the grant of a permit, and Commission determined that
the project would take over ten years to complete. Company appealed and
alleged that: (1) Commission misconstrued the applicable law when it
determined that Company had only five years to complete the project; (2)
the ALJ disregarded a witness with contrary evidence to its determination
that the project would take over ten years; and (3) Commission
misconstrued applicable law when it determined that it was required to
deny the application based on the lack of land use approvals for Company’s
project. The appellate court held that Commission did not misconstrue
applicable law to either the necessary time span to complete the project or
to deny the application based upon the lack of approvals because the
interpretations were made using the plain language of the statutes in
question. The appellate court also held that the ALJ only disregarded
objected-to portions of the witness’s testimony regarding the time Company
would take to complete the project, so the evidence was otherwise
completely taken in to consideration. The appellate court ruled that
Commission did not err in denying the application.
Texas
Mt. Peak Spec. Util. Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Texas, No. 03-16-00796CV, 2017 WL 5078034 (Tex. App. Nov. 2, 2017).
Utility District sued the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”), seeking
judicial review of PUC’s ruling concerning Utility District’s water service
transmission to the City. PUC had previously granted City’s petition for
expedited release of a portion of its property from the certificated service
area of Utility District. Upon review of the district court, Utility District
contended that the statutory requirements for expedited release had not been
satisfied because City was in fact receiving water service from Utility
District. Utility District also argued that PUC should not have approved the
decertification petition as six and seven-tenths (“6.7”) acres of property
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within Utility District’s certificated service area and owned by City was
excluded from City’s petition. Ruling against Utility District, the district
court affirmed PUC’s approval of City’s petition. The appellate court, the
court affirmed the lower court’s ruling on all issues. With regard to the
exclusion of the 6.7-acres, the court examined whether there are water
facilities or lines committed to serving the property and ultimately held that
City’s exclusion of the 6.7-acres from its petition is not a basis for reversing
PUC’s approval. The court also held that City was not receiving water
service by examining the evidence presented in the decertification
proceedings. Because the existence of water lines near a property does not
necessarily mean the area is receiving water service, the court found
reasonable support to PUC’s fact-based determination affirming City’s
argument. The court also held that PUC’s order does not conflict with a
previous agency order since the agreement in question between Utility
District and City was an agreement separate to the one approved by PUC.
Utah
Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Orange St. Dev., 2017 UT 82, No. 20150439SC, 2017 WL 5634226 (Utah Nov. 22, 2017).
A group of citizens (“Group”) sued, alleging that a one-mile stretch of the
river was navigable water and, therefore, should be open for recreation
under the Public Waters Access Act (“Act”). Group sought only
recreational use rights and no title determination to the waters. The trial
court concluded that the disputed section of the river was navigable under
the “navigability for title” standard set forth in federal “equal footing” law.
It further accepted the testimony of Group’s expert showing regular
commercial use of the river, including the use for transporting timber,
which would be less economical on land. The trial court thus issued an
injunction preventing landowners and state officers from interfering with
the recreational use rights of the public on the stretch of river. Finally, the
trial court concluded that the streambed below the water was held in title by
the State, thus quieting title to the streambed although Group did not assert
this claim. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court
improperly quieted title to the streambed, that its improper reliance on
federal law was harmless error, and that the evidence in the case was
sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the stretch of water
was navigable under the Act.
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Vermont
TransCanada Hydro Ne. Inc. v. Town of Newbury, 2017 VT 117, No. 2016061, 2017 WL 6210911 (Vt. Dec. 8, 2017).
Dam Owner (“Owner”) owns and operates a dam on the Connecticut River
in Hartford, Vermont. The dam is downstream from Town, and Owner has
flow easements that give it the right to flood land abutting the river in
Town. Town had valued the flow easements at $1,532,211.00 for property
tax purposes and Owner challenged the valuation arguing that it was
unsupported by the admissible evidence. Owner argued that the value could
not be based on comparable sales of flow easements because no evidence of
comparable sales existed, and sale prices are influenced by the Owner’s
right to take such easements by eminent domain. Owner and Town had
expert appraisers analyze the surrounding land of the dam and evaluate the
value of the possible flooding easements. Owner’s expert focused on the
acres of land that were actually flooded, whether the flooding was directly
influenced by the dam, and each flooded acre’s possible utility value.
Town’s expert valued all the acres included in the easement as possible
flooding spots and valued them all the same, resulting in a much higher
value. The trial court concluded that the dam was, at any given point,
always liable, at least in part, for all flooding and was able to find middle
ground from both arguments and find a valuation in between the two
experts’ findings – $1,532,211.00. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the trial court could use the uniform per-acre value in
appraising the value of flow easements and that Owner failed to rebut the
presumption that Town’s valuation of flow easements was valid.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Agricultural Use
E.D. North Carolina
In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-00013-BR, 2017 WL
5178038 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017).
Property Owners living near swine farms sued Farm Owner, seeking
monetary damages for nuisance and negligence. Both parties filed several
motions and cross motions for partial summary judgment and motions to
seal. After determining that Property Owners lawfully occupied the affected
properties, the district court denied Farm Owner’s motion for partial
summary judgment. The court found as follows: (1) because the use of
Property Owners’ lands as residences did not extend into an agricultural
area and was in existence long before Farm Owner began his operations,
and because Property Owners’ nuisance claims had nothing to do with
changed conditions in the area, their claims were not barred by the state’s
right-to-farm law and Property Owners were entitled to summary judgment
on that defense; (2) the constant nature of the unpleasantness caused by the
farm made the nuisance a recurring one, meaning Property Owners’
nuisance claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, but recovery
was barred beyond the three years prior to filing suit; (3) Farm Owner
presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment against him
on the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk; (4)
because they owned or occupied their property lawfully and the annoyance
and discomfort alleged flowed from the wrong purportedly created by Farm
Owner, if Property Owners could establish a nuisance, they are entitled to
recover damages for discomfort and annoyance; (5) evidence of Property
Owners’ fear of disease or adverse health effects was not barred in support
of their discomfort and annoyance claims; and (6) the question of punitive
damages was to be decided at the end of Property Owners’ case in chief or
after all evidence was heard.
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California
Citizen’s Voice St. Helena v. City of St. Helena, A146887, 2017 WL
5167817 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 2017).
Interest Group and two citizens (together, “Interest Group” or “Group”)
challenged an approved use permit for a wine production facility. The
Group brought two causes of action: (1) violation of the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) by failing to prepare an
Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”); and (2) violation of planning and
zoning laws. Interest group now appeals the denial of their challenge. City
first argued that Interest Group’s appeal should fail because it failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies. On this issue, the appellate court
determined that the lower court erred in determining that the Group’s
appeal to the City Council does not count as a sufficient attempt to exhaust
administrative remedies because the hearing carried out by a planning
commission included an appeal to the City Council. The court then
determined an EIR was unnecessary because Group failed to provide any
substantial evidence of a potential significant environmental impact after
City presented mitigation measures which addressed the Group’s concerns.
Finally, the plan for the winery did not violate City’s planning or zoning
laws. The plan did not violate planning laws because the winery was not for
a “[s]trictly tourist-serving retail” purpose, and that determination by the
lower court was not unreasonable. Further, the winery plan did not violate
City’s zoning law because Group failed to provide any authority
demonstrating the zoning law was a categorical rule not subject to a
previously established exception for “building[s] that existed prior to 1993”
like the one at issue in this case. Therefore, despite the error by the lower
court regarding the scope of attempted administrative remedies, there is no
basis to accept Group’s two causes of action. The lower court was affirmed.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Missouri
Hill v. Mo. Dept. of Conservation, No. ED 105042, 2017 WL 4507991
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017).
Owners of hunting preserves and breeding operations (“Owners”)
challenged amended regulations enacted by the Missouri Conservation
Commission (“Commission”). The regulations were aimed at the captive
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cervid – elk and deer – industry in an effort to manage the threat of Chronic
Waste Disease (“CWD”) which can be fatal to the cervid population in the
state. Owners sought to enjoin Commission from enforcing the regulations
on the grounds that captive cervids were not “game” or “wildlife resources
of the state” and that the regulations interfered with their right to farm. The
trial court found all of the challenged amended regulations to be invalid and
prohibited Commission from enforcing them. Commission appealed,
alleging three points of error: (1) the trial court erred in entering judgment
for Owners’ claim that Commission lacked authority to regulate captive
cervids as “game” or “wildlife resources of the state” because the
Commission does have constitutional authority to enact regulations
concerning captive cervids that could pass CWD to the state’s non-captive
cervids; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment for Owners on their
claim that the regulations violated their right to farm because Owners were
not engaged in farming or ranching practices and therefore Commission
could regulate Owners; and (3) alternatively, the trial court erred in
enjoining enforcement under Owners’ right to farm claim because the
injunction is overbroad and void as to non-parties. The appeals court held
that it would reverse the trial court on points one and two. However,
because of the general interest and importance of the questions involved, it
transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court.
Wisconsin
Multerer v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2017 WI App 71, 378 Wis. 2d 327, 904
N.W.2d 408.
Landowners’ properties are subject to permanent wetland conservation
easements under federal law preventing future farming on the land.
According to the Wisconsin Administrative Code the properties are not
distinguished of “agricultural use.” Without this distinction, Landowners
cannot take advantage of agricultural property tax breaks. Landowners sued
the Department of Revenue (“DOR”), challenging the validity of this
definition, and alleging a violation of their state and federal equal protection
rights and the Uniformity Clause of Wisconsin’s Constitution. Specifically,
Landowners argue that they are similarly situated to, but treated differently
than, owners of land that have temporary restrictions on agricultural use.
They also alleged that the provision in question was promulgated without
environmental review as required by the Wisconsin Environmental Policy
Act (“WEPA”). The circuit court granted DOR’s motion for summary
judgment and Landowners appeal. The appellate court affirmed. Finding
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rational basis as the appropriate level of scrutiny the court held the
legislature was reasonable in giving preferential tax treatment to land that
can be put to agricultural use in the future, as it encourages such
landowners to keep open the possibility to put their land to agriculture use
at a later date Taxing land at preferential rates that cannot be returned to
such production provides no incentive to Landowners to preserve their land
for farmland, and this difference in goals provides a rational basis for
excluding such land from the definition of “agricultural use” in the state
code. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Easements
Tax Court
Palmolive Bldg. Inv’rs, LLC. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 149 T.C. 18
(2017).
Company executed a conservation easement deed to preserve the exterior
perimeter walls of its building’s façade. The deed prohibited Company
from demolishing, removing, or altering the protected elements without
permission from State’s preservation council (“Council”). At the time of the
execution two mortgages encumbered the building. Before executing the
deed with Council, Company secured agreements from both lenders to
subordinate their mortgages in the property rights to enforce the purposes of
the easements. The deed had provisions regarding the insurances and who
must pay whom. During tax court proceedings, the court noted that in order
to meet the perpetuity requirements, a property interest retained by the
donor must also be subject to legally enforceable restrictions. The court
looked at how a mortgage on the property affects whether a donation of
easement on the property has a lasting value. The court found that the deed
did not satisfy the perpetuity requirements under the tax code and the
mortgage were not subordinated to the easement. Under the tax code “no
deduction will be permitted … for an interest in property which is subject to
a mortgage unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property of
the right of the qualified organization.” The property in this case was not
free and clear, instead the owner borrowed money and used the property as
collateral for his loans. The whole property was insured. Even though
Company donated the façade easement, the façade continued to benefit
Company and its lenders by supporting the insurance coverage. The court
stated that where an owner subject to a mortgage and covered by insurance
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seeks to donate a perpetual easement interest in a façade, the owner may not
hold back an interest in it by using it as collateral for mortgage loans. The
mortgagee’s right in the property must be subordinate to the interest of the
donor. Therefore, the court held that because the requirements of the tax
code were not satisfied at the time of the gift, the conversation easement is
not protected in perpetuity.
California
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Antelope Valley Water Storage, LLC, F072320, 2017
WL 4532471 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017).
A water storage company (“Water Company”) challenged a trial court’s
denial of its motion to dismiss an eminent domain complaint filed by a
public utility company (“PUC”). Among other things, Water Company
contends the trial court erred when it interpreted PUC’s easements over
Water Company’s property as being exclusive and giving PUC the right to
restrict Water Company’s use of the easement property. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court decision, holding that the lower court correctly
interpreted the easements to give PUC the power to limit or exclude Water
Company’s proposed use of the easements. The easements in question
expressly reserved certain rights to the property and prohibited the property
owners from engaging in various activities the court reasoned. Specifically,
per the easement Water Company cannot deposit any substance or material
that, in PUC’s opinion, would endanger or interfere with PUC’s
transmission lines, and, because water is a substance, and water banking it
is an activity which PUC deemed dangerous to its transmission line
activities, PUC had the right to preclude Water Company from using the
property subject to the easements for water banking. This case is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Georgia
PHH Invs. v. Dep't of Transp., 808 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
Landowner’s property, Parcel 6, is near Georgia Highway 400 and has a
strip mall on it. Within that strip mall there is a smaller partial that is owned
by Company. Company leases that parcel to Restaurant. No driveway
existed when Restaurant opened and so it obtained an easement from Parcel
6. In 2014, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) started a project to
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ease traffic flow at busy intersections. DOT filed petitions to condemn part
of Parcel 6 including the easement that Restaurant owned. Company argued
that the reduced access to the highways would impact its business and that
it was entitled to recover diminution in market value. Company appealed
the trial court’s finding that it could not recover the diminution in value of
its contiguous parcel based on the partial taking of its easements over the
adjoining condemned property. The appellate court affirmed the lower
court. The court found that Company cannot recover consequential
damages for Parcel 6 since it does not own it and its neighboring properties
were not condemned.
Kentucky
Majestic Oaks Homeowners Ass’n. Inc. v. Majestic Oaks Farms, Inc., 530
S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2017).
Homeowners sued Developer after Developer continued to utilize an
easement created by a declaration in Developer’s original conveyance of
land to Homeowners, revocable only by a sixty-seven percent majority vote
by Homeowners. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The
trial court granted Developer’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed.
The Kentucky Supreme Court first began by noting that this type of
defeasible easement is recognized in Kentucky, and ends when a specified
action occurs. Finding that easements are a type of restriction mentioned in
the original conveyance from Developer to Homeowners, it was a revocable
easement in areas of both property law and contract law. Therefore, the
court held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to
Developer, and instead entered summary judgment for Homeowners.
Michigan
Collins v. Schmidt, No. 336967, 2017 WL 4798253 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct.
24, 2017).
Landowners had an appurtenant easement across a road that went through
Neighbor’s property. Neighbor built a garage on his property and re-graded
the road to have access to the garage from the road. Landowners claimed
that the re-grading unilaterally modified the easement and caused them to
lose rights to their easement because of the degree that must be climbed. It
also caused them to lose the ability to move their mobile home to their
property. The trial court heard oral argument over the issues for two days
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and decided that Neighbor had not modified the easement and had not
unreasonably interfered with the easement because the road was still
passable after the modifications. The appellate court affirmed that there was
no modification to the easement due to Neighbor’s use of the property, but
vacated and remanded on the issue of whether Landowner’s mobile home
can be transported to their property because according to the easement,
Neighbors may not interfere with Landowners’ rights to use the road for
such. On appeal, Landowners also brought up an issue of denial of due
process because the trial court did not rule on trespass from soil from the regrading being deposited upon their property, but the issue was not
preserved for appeal and was not specifically brought before the trial court
in the pleadings, so the appellate court held that there was no denial of due
process. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Douglass v. Barrett, No. 334352, 2017 WL 5759780 (Mich. App. Ct. Nov.
28, 2017).
Landowner 1 sued Landowner 2 over the use of two driveways, one gravel
and the other paved. The gravel driveway ran on both Landowners’
properties. The lower court ruled in favor of Landowner 1 regarding the
gravel driveway because of the doctrine of acquiescence. Further, the lower
court determined that Landowner 2’s claim against Landowner 3 should be
denied because Landowner 3 had an easement appurtenant which burdened
Landowner 2’s property. Landowner 2 blocked access to the gravel
driveway, forcing Landowner 1 to use a dirt two-track to access his home.
Landowner 2 further claimed that it had maintained and used the gravel
driveway for twenty-eight years and a witness (Landowner 1’s neighbor)
testified Landowner 1’s long-time use of the gravel driveway. Despite
Landowner 2’s contention, the appellate court determined that Landowner 1
properly demonstrated acquiescence for the statutory period (fifteen years)
over the gravel driveway. This was because Landowner 1 demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence that it had the exclusive right to the
driveway for over two decades—the testimony was sufficient and the court
deferred to the lower court’s factual finding. What’s more, Landowner 2
failed to provide any authority for its proposition that the statute of frauds
should be applied. Regarding the dispute between Landowners 2 and 3, the
appellate court determined that the lower court did not err in its conclusion
that there should be termination of the right-of-way easement along
Landowner 3’s property line. This was because an easement appurtenant
was found and no evidence was submitted to the lower court that there was
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“a merger of [Landowner 3’s] parcels, abandonment of the easement, or
termination of that easement.” This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Gunther v. Apap, No. 333169, 2017 WL 4654975 (Mich. App. Oct. 17,
2017).
Lakefront Property Owners brought suit against Backlot Property Owners,
seeking a permanent injunction in regard to a pathway and boating activity
in front of Lakefront Property Owners’ homes. The trial court granted
summary disposition to Backlot Property Owners, holding that Lakefront
Property Owners lacked standing because Lakefront Property Owners did
not have a property interest in the pathway used by Backlot Property
Owners to access the lake. Lakefront Property Owners argue that Backlot
Property Owners possess an interest only in a right of way over the strip
solely for pedestrian purposes without any riparian rights allowing Backlot
Property Owners to construct a dock and keep boats in the water on a long
term basis. On appeal, Lakefront Property Owners argued that they
themselves own the nine-foot strip of land in question. Alternatively,
Lakefront Property Owners argue that, even if they themselves do not own
the strip, Lakefront Property Owners’ riparian property rights are affected
since Backlot Property Owners activities extend beyond the strip and onto
bottomlands owned by Lakefront Property Owners. Citing Michigan law,
which holds that a right of way for pedestrian access does not extend to
riparian rights, the appellate court held that Lakefront Property Owners’
lack of apparent ownership of the strip is not dispositive. Thus, the
appellate court examined, more broadly, whether Backlot Property Owners’
activities give rise to a trespass or a nuisance with respect to Lakefront
Property Owners’ undisputed riparian rights and property interest. The
appellate court ultimately held that Lakefront Property Owners should be
allowed to amend their complaint to add a claim for nuisance and a claim to
quiet title to their riparian property. This is an unpublished opinion of the
court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case
as precedent.
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Mississippi
Mayton v. Oliver, No. 2015–CA–01875–COA, 2017 WL 5907555 (Miss.
Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2017).
Landowners sued Neighbor, alleging that Neighbor had violated a
restrictive covenant and interfered with express or prescriptive drainage
easements when Neighbor blocked a PVC pipe that emptied water from
Landowners’ properties onto Neighbor’s. The trial court found for
Neighbor, and decided that Landowners had failed to establish the existence
of either an express or prescriptive easement. Therefore, Landowners
claims for relief for damages were denied. On appeal, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision that Landowners had not established that
an easement existed.
Montana
Edmiston v. Gerken, 2017 MT 255N, 404 P.3d 709 (Table).
Landowners obtained an easement through a sale of land from the previous
owner and from previous owners of the adjoining tracks of land. The
easement stated that it was “intended to be a driveway to serve Tracts 44
and 37 and [was] not intended to establish or create a roadway, easement,
or travel corridor to serve any other Tract or property other than that
described herein.” The easement also included a provision regarding gates:
“No gate or obstruction shall be placed over, through, or across the
easement granted . . . without the prior written consent of the owners of
each such tracts.” Landowners purchased Tract 37. After granting
Landowners the easement, the seller sold Tract 44 to the new owner of the
adjoining tracks (“Neighbors”). Landowners subsequently built a gate
without prior consent from Neighbors or the previous owner and placed
timber and brush from their property on to Neighbors’ land. Neighbors sued
Landowners claiming that the gate obstructed their use of the easement to
access parts of their land and that the timber’s placement was a nuisance.
The lower court found that the timber and brush pile was a nuisance and
that the construction of a gate required permission from Neighbors and the
previous owner. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the easement required permission to build a gate and that the purpose
of using the easement as a driveway would be frustrated if any tract owner
could erect a gate blocking the easement without obtaining permission from
the remaining tract owners. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
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therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
New Jersey
Lake Grinnell Ass’n v. Post, No. A-3224-15T2, 2017 WL 4818718 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2017).
Landowners own a lakefront residence and enjoy an appurtenant easement
for use of the lake. A lake association (“Association”) issued upon
Landowners an order to pay a sum of money as their pro rata share of
maintenance fees for the lake and a dam. After refusing to pay, Association
brought a collection suit, demanding judgment for the amount owed, plus
interest, fees, and costs. The trial court granted Association’s motion for
summary judgment based upon the complaint and several certifications
which were entered on Association’s behalf. Landowners appealed, and the
appellate court reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the motion
record did not show there was no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged, the summary judgment standard. The court further reasoned
that the record did not support the trial court’s finding that the fees the
Association charged Landowners were reasonable. Summarily, the court
held that on the summary judgment record, there were inadequate facts
from which a court can analyze and resolve the equitable considerations
underlying the parties’ contentions. This is an unpublished opinion of the
court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case
as precedent.
New York
GMMM Westover LLC v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 N.Y.S.3d 754
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Utility Corporation appealed the trial court’s ruling that a reciprocal
easement agreement (“REA”) was still in place and, thus, Utility
Corporation was required to vacate Power Plant Operator’s (“Operator”)
facilities. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Utility Corporation was
required to vacate Operator’s premises because a plain reading of the REA
provided that Utility Corporation was required to have severed its
transmission facilities from the premises no later than a previous date.
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Pennsylvania
Gravel Hill Enters. v. Lower Mount Bethel Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 172
A.3d 754 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
Owners purchased land in 2008 after previous owner defaulted on a federal
load. In 2014, Owners filed an application with the Township Zoning
Hearing Board (“Board”) seeking variance to permit the operation of a
stump shredder and grinder to produce mulch and top soil. Neighboring
property owners (“Intervenors”) appeared at the hearing to oppose Owners’
application. Board denied Owner’s application, stating that the proposed
use would be detrimental to the public welfare, have a negative impact on
the character of the neighborhood, and did not constitute the minimum
variance to afford relief. Owners appealed. In 2015, Intervenors filed a
petition to intervene with the trial court, and Owners filed an answer
opposing the petition asserting that it was untimely, Intervenors’ interests
were already adequately represented by Board, and granting the petition
would cause undue delay to the resolution of the matter at hand. The trial
court, on October 30, 2015, granted Intervenors’ petition to intervene. In
November 2015, the trial court approved a settlement agreement and
adopted it as an order, to which Intervenors appealed, arguing that the trial
court had abused its discretion in approving the settlement. On appeal, the
appellate court held that: (1) Intervenors did not waive their right to an
appeal; (2) Intervenors were not deprived of due process; and (3) the trial
court did abuse its discretion in approving the settlement. Accordingly, the
court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court order.
Other Land Issues – Federal
Federal Claims
Balagna v. United States, Nos. 14–21L/16–405L, 2017 WL 4416820 (Fed.
Cl. Oct. 5, 2017).
Landowners sued Government alleging an improper taking of land that
abutted a railroad right-of-way. The court reviewed cross-motions for
summary judgement involving several issues, including: (1) Government’s
contention that the railroad owned portions of property underlying the
railroad corridor; (2) Government’s contention that the issuance of a Notice
of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) did not result in a taking of access to certain
properties; and (3) Government’s claim that it had not taken the property of
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two municipal corporations. The court concluded that Government was
entitled to summary judgement on all three claims. The court determined
that: (1) Illinois state law provided that the railroad owns the part of a
railroad corridor crossing Landowners’ properties; (2) that Illinois law
guaranteed Landowners a right of access to property, and, thus, the issuance
of an NITU does not affect those state law crossing rights; and (3) that the
state consented to use of the Municipal properties as a trail.
Other Land Issues – State
Iowa
C & D Mount Farms Corp. v. R & S Farms, Inc., No. 16-1586, 2017 WL
4570434 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017).
This case involved a berm that separated a dominant estate owner’s
(“Landowner-1”) farmland from the servient owner’s (“Landowner-2”)
farmland. In 2014, Landowner-1 obtained a permit from the Iowa
Department of Natural Resources to increase the berm’s height.
Landowner-2 sued Landowner-1 alleging that the berm raised the
elevations of Landowner-1’s land and caused excess water to flow onto and
remain on Landowner-2’s land. Landowner-2 brought claims for nuisance,
trespass, and breach of common law and statutory duty. The lower court
concluded that the berm did not create a nuisance or trespass because the
level of water flow would be the same whether the berm existed or not.
Testimony from both Landowners’ experts established that Landowner-2’s
land would always receive water before Landowner-1’s, regardless of
whether Landowner-1’s land receives water. Additionally, because the
berm and ditch kept Landowner-1’s land dry while also draining
Landowner-2’s land, and because Landowner-2 acknowledged the
existence of the berm prior to Landowner-2’s acquisition of the land,
Landowner-2 failed to prove that Landowner-1 had abandoned the
prescriptive easement. Therefore, the court concluded that Landowner-2
failed to prove that Landowner-1 violated common law or statutory duties.
The lower court concluded that the berm did not increase the area of
Landowner-2’s land affected by floodwater. The court affirmed the lower
court’s conclusion that no nuisance or trespass occurred. Landowner-2 then
sought injunctive relief to prevent Landowner-1 from increasing the height
of the berm. The court concluded that there was no apparent invasion or
threatened invasion of a right.
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Kansas
Jenkins v. Chi. Pac. Corp., 403 P.3d 1213 (Kan. 2017).
Landowner sued to quiet title to real property that a now-abandoned railway
once ran through. Landowner traced her ownership to a deed which
conveyed the lots in question to a railroad company (“Railroad”). After
Railroad abandoned the railway, it quitclaimed its interest to a company
that eventually quitclaimed its interest to Landowner. The court considered
whether the deed expressly or impliedly conveyed the property for use as a
right of way. If the deed conveyed the property for use as a right of way to
the railroad company, the deed would have only granted an easement that
would revert to the original landowners once the railway was abandoned,
because railroads who receive property in this manner only receive an
easement from the deed. If the deed did not expressly or impliedly convey
the property for use as a right of way, or if it indicated no specific use by a
railway, absolute title would have been conveyed. The district court entered
summary judgement against Landowner, finding that the deed conveying
the property to the railroad described the property in a manner that could be
construed as a right of way. Therefore, only an easement was granted, and it
reverted back to the original landowners when the railway was abandoned.
As a result, when Railroad quitclaimed its interest to its successor company
who quitclaimed to Landowner, Railroad deeded land that it did not legally
own. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with the lower courts that the
conveyance to Landowner from Railroad’s successor was in error since the
deed had conveyed only an easement to Railroad, not a grantable estate.
Louisiana
Thompson v. FRF Properties, 2017-0152 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/17); 229
So.3d 598.
Landowners of Lot A had ancestors in title who created a servitude in favor
of Lot B (an adjacent lot owned by Company) “for the purpose of
maintaining a driveway to provide access to [Lot B].” The servitude
driveway sat on both Lots. Landowners began a dispute with a resident of
Company’s four-plex regarding where the resident parked her vehicle. After
this dispute began, Landowners claimed that they built a fence on the Lot B
side of the driveway and that the driveway was not used to access the rear
of the property—the original intent of the servitude. The lower court ruled
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in favor of Landowner, terminating the servitude for nonuse. Company
makes two arguments on appeal: (1) it provided sufficient evidence
demonstrating use which would overcome the required ten years of nonuse
for termination, and (2) the lower court’s dismissal of some uses of the
servitude as “illegal uses,” which do not quality as ‘use’ for termination
purposes. The appellate court agreed with Company’s first argument
because the lower court did not have any factual basis to come to its
decision. Specifically, one of Company’s witnesses testified that he saw
people use the driveway routinely to access Lot B for thirty-four of the
forty years he lived in the four-plex on Lot B. The court also determined
this argument is moot because the lower court did not terminate the
servitude on this ground. Finally, the court determined that, given the
language of the original servitude (use of the word “access” to Lot B), it’s
purpose is for passage to the Lot, not just the rear of the lot. Therefore,
because the driveway was used to access Lot B, the lower court’s judgment
was reversed.
Minnesota
Resolution Setting Forth Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law & Order
Denying S. M. Hentges & Sons, Inc. & Jordan Gravel, LLC Application for
an Interim Use Permit for Aggregate Mining & Processing Operation in
Sand Creek Twp., No. A16-1768, 2017 WL 5242456 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
13, 2017).
Developer challenged County’s denial of an application for an interim use
permit to operate an aggregate mine on a parcel of land that allowed for
mining as an interim use. Developers proposed a mine that would be
located above and below the water table and would require a large
groundwater pond in the center of the parcel and around a maximum of 110
round trips per day of mine-related truck traffic. The surrounding
landowners operated water wells that drew from the aquifer. Additionally,
the parcel in question was located in a floodplain, which historically
flooded multiple times per year. County claimed that the wells would be
negatively impacted by floodwaters entering the aquifer via the pond and
that, in addition to financial security for well replacements, Developer
should be responsible for monitoring and mitigation of water aesthetics.
County ultimately denied the application as it felt that the project would
have a negative impact on public roadways, water wells, and the public
health due to the potential impact the project could have on the safety and
aesthetic of water from the aquifer. The court reviewed Developer’s claim
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that denial of the application by County was arbitrary and capricious
because the County’s findings were not supported in the record and
negative impacts of the project could be remedied by imposing permit
conditions. The court found that County was justified in denying the permit
because they had a rational basis supported by the record to deny
Developer’s application. Therefore, the denial was not arbitrary and
capricious. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
New York
In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3, 65 N.Y.S.3d 552 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
Landowner sought compensation for property, which had been designated
as wetlands, that was acquired by City for a stormwater management
project. After concluding that Landowner had established a reasonable
probability that the burden of the wetlands regulations on the property
would constitute an unconstitutional taking, the trial court awarded
Landowner an incremental amount above the regulated value of the
property. City appealed, arguing that a purchaser of property that is already
subject to wetlands regulations is barred from pursuing a regulatory takings
claim. The appellate court affirmed for several reasons. First, because there
was no showing that the regulation was a background principle of state law,
the reasonable probability incremental increase rule may still be applied
when valuing regulated wetlands property taken by condemnation. Second,
because a diminution in value, along with prohibition on development of
the property, was effectuated by the regulations, Landowner established
that there was a reasonable probability that the burden of the wetlands
regulations on the property would constitute a regulatory taking. Finally,
because the incremental amount awarded by the trial court was not
supported by sufficient evidence or satisfactorily explained, the court
reduced the amount awarded based upon market data and remitted for entry
of an appropriate final decree.
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Ohio
Bosky Grp., LLC v. Columbus & Ohio River R.R. Co., Fifth Dist.
Muskingum, No. CT2017–0027, 2017 WL 4786758 (Oct. 19, 2017).
Railroad appealed the trial court’s decision granting Property Owner
summary judgment on its claim that Railroad was required build a rail
crossing on Property Owner’s lot pursuant to an agreement made between
Railroad and a prior property owner. The court determined the issue in the
case was whether the promise contained in the prior agreement to construct
a rail crossing was binding on Railroad after the property had since been
purchased by Property Owner. The court found that the trial court did not
err in finding that a right to a rail crossing runs perpetually with the land.
The court determined that the intent of the parties alone is dispositive to
determining whether an easement, such as a rail crossing, runs with a piece
of land. In this case, the court determined that it was the intention of the
parties when the agreement was signed in 1890 that the easement would be
perpetual in nature, therefore, Railroad was obligated to construct a rail
crossing on Property Owner’s land.
Pennsylvania
UGI Utilities, Inc. v. City of Reading, No. 499 M.D. 2015, 2017 WL
5580066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 21, 2017).
Utility Company sued City seeking a declaratory judgment that certain city
ordinances were invalid and sought to permanently enjoin City from
enforcing those ordinances. Utility Company argued that an ordinance that
imposed restrictions on the location of gas meters in historic districts was
preempted by state code. Utility Company moved for partial summary
judgment on this ground. The court held that City’s ordinance was
preempted and could not be applied to the regulated utility. The court found
that: (1) the regulatory code of the state governs itself; (2) the public utility
commissions have exclusive authority over the regulation of public utility
facilities; and (3) the local ordinance conflicted with the code of the state.
Therefore, the court granted partial summary judgment to Utility Company
and enjoined City from enforcing its ordinance.
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South Dakota
Long v. State, 2017 S.D. 79, 904 N.W.2d 502.
State constructed a highway with culverts that could only withstand up to a
certain amount of rainfall, but had a twelve and one-half percent chance of
being exceeded in any given year. On July 30, 2010, the culverts capacity
was exceeded and runoff flooded Landowners’ properties. Landowners
sued State and City for inverse condemnation. Landowners and City came
to a settlement, but the case was heard against State at the appellate court.
State sought for City to either contribute or indemnify it for any judgment
against it, which the court denied because State did not show that City was
responsible for the property damage. The court granted relief to
Landowners and State appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota. On
appeal, State contended that the appellate court erred on the issues of
whether the: (1) claims were barred by sovereign immunity; (2) highway
construction caused of the property damage; (3) State was entitled to
contribution or indemnification against City; and (4) State had a drainage
easement over the damaged property. The South Dakota Supreme Court
held that: (1) State did not have sovereign immunity against the claim
because the claim was grounded in the State’s constitution; (2) the highway
construction and failed culverts were the proximate cause of Landowners’
property damage and such was established conclusively by Landowners’
expert witnesses; (3) State was not entitled to contribution or
indemnification because State did not prove that City was also responsible
for the property damage although Landowners would be paid twice for their
property values from both City and State; and (4) State did not argue over
the issue of a drainage easement at trial so State could not now raise the
issue. The court affirmed the findings of the lower court.
Tennessee
Lutzak v. Phoenix Am. Dev. Partners, L.P., No. M2015-02117-COA-R3CV, 2017 WL 4685300 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017).
Property Owner sued Developer, seeking a declaratory judgment that
restrictive covenants governing Developer’s adjacent subdivision did not
apply to Property Owner’s undeveloped property. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the lower court held that the undeveloped property was
not covered by the express terms of the Declaration of Covenants, which
governed the property to which the restrictive covenants applied. In doing
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so, the court rejected Developer’s argument that chain of title extended the
covenants to the undeveloped property. The court also refused to impose
the restrictive covenants as implied negative reciprocal easements because
Developer expressly chose to retain a right to deviate from the initial plan
by altering the property contained within the subdivision and subjecting
additional property to the restrictive covenants in the declaration.
Reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo, the appellate court affirmed
both the lower court’s decisions and its reasoning.
Texas
Dragon v. Trial, No. 04-16-00758-CV, 2017 WL 5162180 (Tex. App. Nov.
8, 2017).
In 1932, the property at issue—237 acres of land—was conveyed in equal
shares to seven siblings owning an undivided 1/7th interest in the
property. One sibling signed and recorded a deed conveying one-half (½) of
all his right, title and interest in and to the property to his wife
("Wife"). Purchasers purchased the 237 acres from the still-living siblings
in 1992, following which Wife's husband died. Under the Gift Deed, Wife
was the independent executrix of the estate and trustee of her husband's
Trial Trust. Wife continued to accept and endorse payments made for the
purchase of the property and then died. Under Wife's will, her Sons
received the corpus of the trust estate, which included a mineral reservation
that expired after fifteen years, at which point the mineral estate vested in
Purchasers. As oil and gas production continued, the Lessee paid a portion
of the royalties to Sons. Purchasers filed suit against Sons, alleging breach
of contract (the 1992 Deed), estoppel by deed, trespass to try title by
limitations, suit to quiet title by limitations, and promissory
estoppel, arguing that in the 1992 Deed, each sibling purported to convey
100% of their 1/7th interest and not merely a portion of their interest. The
court held in favor of Purchasers, reasoning that because the
sibling conveyed one-half of all his interest to Wife and thus did not
actually own a full 1/7th interest in the land, he breached the warranty
contained in the 1992 Deed "at the very time and execution of the deed"
because he purported to convey what he did not own. The court also held
that Sons were remainder beneficiaries of the estate and trust, and,
therefore, bound by the recitals in the 1992 Deed and estopped from
asserting title to any interests in contradiction to their father's duty to
defend Purchasers against all claims to all that certain parcel or tract of
land.
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Virginia
Woolford v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 806 S.E.2d 398 (Va. 2017).
The Department of Taxation ("Department") rescinded $4,900,000.00 in
land preservation tax credits that it had previously awarded to Landowner,
citing Landowner's speculative analysis, conflicting data, lack of
qualifications, and failure to meet the requirements of the State’s
Code. The trial court sustained the decision, reasoning that the appraiser
that Landowner hired was not a qualified appraiser within the statutory
meaning, noting that he was not formally educating in appraising
minerals, specifically the sand and gravel market. Landowner appealed. The
Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court, holding that the
appraiser hired by Landowner was a qualified appraiser. It reasoned that the
appraiser was qualified by virtue of his experience in evaluating properties
that contained sand and gravel deposits, and that the record unequivocally
showed that he expended considerable effort in learning about sand and
gravel mines in general and about the local and regional market for those
products in particular. The court also noted that unless Department could
conclude in good faith that the value of the conservation easement
Landowner donated to the Virginia Outdoors Foundation is zero, it would
need to award Landowner tax credits for the fair market value of the
donation.
West Virginia
Tex. E. Transmission, LP v. W. Va. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 807 S.E.2d 802
(W. Va. 2017).
Coal Company claims ownership of certain coal reserves. It further
contends that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection
(“WVDEP”) issued a mining permit authorizing expiration, development,
and extraction of coal. Coal Company submitted a substance control plan as
part of the permit revision application. transmission and gas companies
(“Companies”) objected to Coal Company’s permit revision. A public
hearing was held and WVDEP approved the permit revision application.
Companies appealed the revision to the circuit claiming a defect because
Coal Company failed to conduct the mining operations in a way that would
protect the Companies’ pipeline, and failed to specify that subsidence
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control plan measure would be taken to protect Companies pipeline from
damage. The court agreed with Coal Company, and Companies appealed
again to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Companies argued
that Coal Company failed to meet the requirement of demonstrating that its
permit revision application complied with the West Virginia Utility
Protection Standard. The court noted the Utility Protection Standard is a
performance one and should not be confused with application requirements
for pre-mining permits and permit revisions. Under state law each applicant
for underground mining permit must contain a subsidence control plan.
This plan must contain a survey that identifies structures and give a
narrative whether substance could cause material damage or diminution of
value. Companies argued that Coal Company failed to comply with this
requirement by failing to include a narrative indicating whether or not
subsidence could cause damage and the minimization steps it would take.
The court noted that the state law used phrases include which demonstrates
examples not giving an exclusive list. Regarding the pipeline, Coal
Company did contain a narrative describing the substance control plan.
Furthermore, it set out the action it would take thus meeting the necessary
requirements. The court recognized that the “[regulation] may not be
interpreted to be less stringent than its federal counterpart.” The court held
“that [state statute] does not abrogate state common law with respect to
subjacent support waivers contained within coal severance deeds.”
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS
Renewable Generation
First Circuit
Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Mass. Electric Co., 875 F.3d 64 (1st Cir.
2017).
Solar Facilities Developer sued Electric Company, seeking to compel
Electric Company to purchase power from Solar Facilities Developer at a
negotiated rate rather than under a lower-priced standardized rate. Under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), Solar
Facilities Developer argued that the state-approved standard power
purchase rate offered by Electric Company was unenforceable. The
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities denied Solar Facilities
Developer's petition, holding that Electric Company's offer had been both
reasonable and consistent with its own regulations. While Solar Facilities
Developer could have sued the state utility regulatory agency for a PURPA
violation, the district court denied Solar Facilities Developer’s attempt to
sue Electric Company and granted Electric Company’s motion for summary
judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that, because
there is no express or implied private right of action for initiating suit in its
statutory language, PURPA does not authorize claims between electric
utility companies and cogeneration facilities. The appellate court
additionally noted that Electric Company had never previously agreed to
any specific cost rate with Solar Facilities Developer. The court held that
Solar Facilities Developer failed to show that Congress had unequivocally
conferred a private right of action for qualifying facilities against utilities to
enforce PURPA's must-buy provision. Rather than for a qualifying facility
such as Solar Facilities Developer to bring private action against an electric
utilities company, the qualifying facility may file a petition with the state
commission and appeal any potential adverse decision in state court.
N.D. California
Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, No. 13–CV–04934–JD, 2017 WL
6040012 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017).
Solar energy provider (“Provider”) sued the Commissioners of the
California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) arguing that as three
CPUC orders conflicted with federal law they violated the Supremacy
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Clause of the United States’ Constitution, and thus Provider should not
have to follow them. Provider sought declaratory and injunctive relief from
a program established by CPUC orders called “Re-Mat” (Renewable
Market-Adjusting Tariff), which regulates the terms on which utility
companies must purchase power from alternative energy facilities, like
Provider. Following a one-day bench trial, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Provider. The court reasoned that the Re-Mat program
violated the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and was thus in conflict
with federal law. Accordingly, the court granted Provider the injunctive and
declaratory relief it requested, but nothing more. This case has since been
appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
Rates
Maryland
Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 172 A.3d 927 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2017).
Utility Company appealed lower court’s affirmation of Commission’s
denial of some parts of a proposed strategic infrastructure development plan
(“Plan”). Utility Company claimed that Commission relied on its
misinterpretation of a state code in making its determination. Commission
should have instead, Utility Company argues, allowed for recovery of some
expenses for infrastructure improvements that would ultimately benefit the
public. In contrast with other “rate-making” cases, however, the proposed
Plan incorporated a mechanism for funding derived from a local law, and
the funds derived under that law operated differently. Such funds were only
eligible for projects within the state, even if some outside-state projects
ultimately benefited the same state long-term in a less direct way through
the company’s development. This court examined the Commission’s
determination and found Utility Company’s arguments unpersuasive,
entertaining only two of the three (dismissing Utility Company’s policy
argument). The court determined that the statute must be read in its entirety
to appropriately discern the legislature’s meaning, which supports
Commission’s interpretation. Additionally, the court found that the
legislative history, with emphasis on comments regarding infrastructure
improvement using these types of funds within the state of Maryland,
pointed to an intent to use those funds for projects within the state.
Therefore, the court affirmed Commission’s decision, holding that “the
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STRIDE law's accelerated cost recovery mechanism is available only for
projects located in Maryland.”
Michigan
In re Consumers Energy Co., No. 330675, No. 330745, No. 330797, 2017
WL 4518895 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).
Energy Company self-implemented a rate increase of $110,000,000.00
above its current rates for the sale of electricity, as well as an elimination of
customer credit. These actions raised its retail rates by $166,000,000.00
with a return on common equity ("ROE") of ten and seven-tenths
percent. The ALJ issued a Proposal for Decision ("PFD") recommending
that Energy Company's overall rate of return be set at six and nine-one
hundredths percent including an ROE of ten percent. Following the PFD,
the Public Service Commission ("PSC") issued an order authorizing Energy
Company to raise its rates, rejecting requests by the Attorney General and
the Residential Customer Group ("RCG") to terminate the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure ("AMI") system requested by Energy
Company. The Attorney General appealed. The appellate court upheld the
PSC's order approving an ROE of ten and three-tenths percent reasoning
that it was lawful, reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious; the court
noted that such a rate was consistent with ROEs approved in other
Midwestern states and that lowering the company's ROE would impede
Energy Company's ability to secure financing for future investments. The
PSC is statutorily required to consider and give due weight to all lawful
elements necessary to determine an appropriate rate, and the court found
that it acted consistently with its statutory authority. The court also held that
the installation of a smart meter on a customer's home did not violate the
customer's rights under the Fourth Amendment because Energy Company
was not a state actor, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment applies
only to government actions.
Missouri
Matter of Application of Laclede Gas Co. to Change Its Infrastructure Sys.
Replacement Surcharge in Its Missouri Gas Energy Serv. Territory v. Office
of Pub. Counsel, No. WD 80544, 2017 WL 5574857 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov.
21, 2017).
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Public Counsel appealed an order from the Missouri Public Service
Commission (“Commission”) granting Gas Company, a public utility gas
corporation, an increase in existing infrastructure system replacement
surcharges imposed on its and Missouri Gas Energy’s service territories.
Gas Company successfully sought increased surcharges from Commission
to recover costs of temporary plastic mains and service lines installed as
patches in association with the replacement of existing deteriorating cast
iron and unprotected steel gas infrastructure systems. Public Counsel
objected to the recovery of costs by an increase in the surcharges. Public
Counsel alleged that the replacement costs were not eligible for an increase
under state law because the plastic service lines being replaced were not
worn out or deteriorated and their replacement was not done to comply with
government-mandated safety requirements as the law mandates. Gas
Company initially argued, and Commission agreed, that the plastic service
lines were installed as an integral component to temporarily extend the life
of the deteriorating cast iron and steel systems while entire systems were
being replaced and was thus eligible for a surcharge increase. The court
noted that no party claimed that the plastic service lines where in a worn out
or deteriorated condition, a condition that the law mandates and is narrowly
interpreted in order to be eligible for a surcharge increase. As such, the
court found that a surcharge increase to recover costs associated with the
replacement of the plastic service lines did not meet the conditions stated in
the plain language of the state law. Therefore, the court reversed the
Commission’s order.
Tennessee
B&W Pipeline, LLC v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., No. M2016-02013-COAR12-CV, 2017 WL 5135977 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2017).
Utility proposed to Authority a rate increase pertaining to the supply of gas
to three counties. In determining the base rate, Utility contended that the
investment made in purchasing the pipeline and wells, totaling over
$2,600,000.00 should be included as a reasonable estimate of the original
cost of the pipeline. Authority denied the inclusion of the purchase price of
the pipeline and wells, instead relying on a 2008 tax return as the more
accurate measure of the pipeline’s original depreciated cost. Finding that
the purchase of the pipeline and wells cost less than the value to repair
existing infrastructure, Authority set the cost of the equipment as reflected
in the tax forms, lowering the cost to Utility to $854,000.00. This lower
cost to Utility therefore did not justify the substantial rate increase to be
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passed onto customers, and the increase was denied by Authority. On
appeal, the court of appeals upheld the base calculation, finding no abuse of
discretion or public policy considerations that would justify overturning
Authority’s decision.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Bankruptcy
D. Delaware
In re La Paloma Generating, Co., Case No: 16-12700 (CSS), 2017 WL
5197116 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2017).
Company owns a natural gas-fired electricity plant. Operation of this
facility includes the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. In
2015, the facility had emissions of 2,0678,035 metric of tons of carbon
dioxide. Emissions of gas have continued at the same rate in 2016 and
2017. Company satisfied all of its obligations required by regulation. On
December 6, 2016, Company filed a voluntary petition with the court for
relief under chapter 11. Company plans to sell all of its assets, but at issue
here is whether or not it can sell the assets without surrendering compliance
instruments under the California Cap-and-Trade Program. Company argues
that it can sell its assets free and clear of all interest under the bankruptcy
code, whereas California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) argues that it’s
interest – the compliance instruments – in the assets, including the electric
plant, does transfer to the successor owner. The court held that neither the
bankruptcy code nor State law imposes such successor liability, therefore,
Company can sell the plant without surrendering the compliance
instruments for greenhouse gas emissions.
E.D. Missouri
In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529-399, 2017 WL 4843724
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017).
Energy Company sued seeking an order enjoining City and Counties from
prosecuting their complaints and requiring them to dismiss those actions
with prejudice after Company successfully filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. Alleging that Energy Company’s behavior was
responsible for various types of climate-change-related damage in
California, City and Counties asserted eight causes of action—one count of
public nuisance on behalf of citizens of the state of California, and the
following seven counts on behalf of residents of City and Counties: (1)
public nuisance, (2) strict liability for failure to warn, (3) strict liability for
design defect, (4) private nuisance, (5) negligence, (6) negligence for
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failure to warn, and (7) trespass. The crux of this action was the
interpretation of the Plan and Confirmation Order Provisions set forth by
the court in the bankruptcy action, which was negotiated extensively
between Energy Company and several government agencies. The EPA
added clarifying terms which City and Counties contended altered the
agreement in a fashion that allowed their claims to continue. The district
court found that: (1) because City and Counties were aware of Energy
Company’s bankruptcy case and failed to file proof of claims or otherwise
participate in that action, they failed to establish any “pre-petition” claims,
and their current claims should be discharged; (2) none of City and
Counties asserted claims fell within the exceptions to the discharge of the
EPA provisions; and (3) the first cause of action on behalf of all citizens of
California constitutes a “claim” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code because
the relief it sought was clearly enumerated in the Code.
N.D. Texas
In re Aeon Operating, Inc., No. 15-33935-hdh7, 2017 WL 4457437 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017).
Debtor filed suit against Oil Companies, seeking the avoidance and
recovery of certain prepetition transfers as either fraudulent transfers or
preferences. Alternatively, Debtor sought recovery against Oil Companies
for breach of contract. Debtor is an oil and gas operator responsible for both
production, sales, and expenses associated with the production of the
relevant wells. Oil Companies own a working interest in the relevant wells
through a Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”). Debtor filed for
bankruptcy under chapter 7 several months after the PSA interest
transferred. In conjunction with the PSA, several wire transfers occurred
through a revenue sweep prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy filing. At the time of
the revenue sweep and the related wire transfers, Debtor was insolvent. The
court held that, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code, the revenue sweep was an
avoidable fraudulent transfer because Debtor received “less than a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange and was insolvent on the date of
such transfer.” Similarly, the court held the first wire transfer as an
avoidable fraudulent transfer. Unlike the first wire transfer, the second wire
transfer was made for the benefit of a creditor related to an antecedent debt,
which enabled the creditor to receive more than it would in a chapter 7
filing. Because Oil Companies did not present evidence for an ordinary
course of business defense under Bankruptcy Code, the court held the
second wire transfer as an avoidable preference pursuant to Bankruptcy
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Code. In regard to Debtor’s breach of contract claim relating to the PSA
between Oil Companies, the court found the claim lacking because Debtor
was neither a party nor an intended third party beneficiary to the PSA.
S.D. Texas
In re Montco Offshore, Inc., NO: 17-31646, 2017 WL 4417588 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017).
In 2015, Creditors filed an involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition
against Offshore Operation Company (“Debtor”), which subsequently
entered into a Contract with Service Company. In performing under the
Contract, Service Company alleged that it encountered wells, equipment,
and structures undisclosed in the Contract, requiring it to perform
substantial unanticipated work, but Debtor refused to pay Service Company
for the additional work. In 2017, Service Company filed its own Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition and filed an adversary proceeding seeking to recover
amounts due under the Contract. Debtor filed motions to dismiss Service
Company’s amended complaint. As a result, the court found that Service
Company’s declaratory judgment claim added nothing to its existing breach
of contract claims against Debtor, in both, alleging that Debtor failed to pay
for services it completed pursuant to the Contract. All such breach of
contract claims, with the exception of one, were dismissed. Thus, Count VI
of Service Company’s amended complaint was moot or would add nothing
beyond the breach of contract claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed
Service Company’s amended complaint.
Other Issues
N.D. California
California v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 17-cv-03804-EDL,
No. 17-cv-885-EDL, 2017 WL 4416409 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017).
California and New Mexico, together with a coalition of conservation and
tribal groups (“Coalition”), sued the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)
and others for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) when
BLM sought to postpone certain compliance dates for a rule after the rule’s
effective date had passed. The Waste Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation Rule (“Rule”) was designed to help
reduce methane emissions by limiting flaring and venting of natural gas on
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federal and tribal lands. BLM issued a notice of postponement of January
17, 2018 compliance dates, and the district court ruled that BLM had acted
outside its authority to postpone the “effective date” of a rule under the
APA. The court rejected BLM’s argument that “effective date” in the APA
also encompassed compliance dates and found that BLM had violated the
APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. The court ruled that
BLM’s postponement of the compliance dates was arbitrary and capricious
because it considered only the Rule’s costs to the oil and gas industry and
ignored the Rule’s benefits, such as decreased resource waste, air pollution,
and enhanced public revenues. Therefore, the court vacated the
Postponement Notice and held that BLM violated the APA when it issued
the notice. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from
the higher court as of publication.
W.D. Wisconsin
Larchmont Holdings, LLC v. N. Shore Servs., LLC, No. 16-cv-575-slc,
2017 WL 5197415 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2017).
Buyer agreed to pay Seller $4,000,000.00 on a land contract for 300 acres
of wooded land in Wisconsin. Buyer intended to set up a frac sand mine
that it hoped would reap millions in yearly profits. However, the mining
operation never progressed and left Buyer past due on installment
payments. Buyer brought this action and asserted seven different claims for
relief: (1) fraudulent inducement; (2) frustration of purpose; (3) unjust
enrichment; (4) reformation; (5) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; (6) illusory contract; and (7) breach of contract.
Seller counterclaimed for strict foreclosure of the contract and for breach of
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Seller sought summary
judgment on its strict foreclosure counterclaim and on all seven of Buyer’s
claims. In response, Buyer raised several affirmative defenses, including
laches, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands. The court granted in part and
denied in part Seller’s motion for summary judgment. The court denied
Seller’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the counterclaim for
strict foreclosure, but only to the extent that Buyer may proceed on the
affirmative defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands,
because Seller never mentioned Buyer’s affirmative defenses. The court
granted Seller’s motion in all other aspects.
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Delaware
Mooney v. Pioneer Nat. Res. Co., No. N17C-01-225 RRC, 2017 WL
4857133 (Del. Super. Ct. July 27, 2017).
Investor sued Producer for fraudulent misrepresentation of financial
performance. Investor invested in securities of Producer and suffered a
financial loss after a partial divesture of his position. As a result, Investor
claimed that Producer fraudulently misrepresented the financial position of
the company via publicly released quarterly reports in order to induce
investors to buy its securities. Specifically, Investor claimed that Producer
said it was hedging via derivatives to reduce risk when it was really taking
on risk. Producer claimed that Investor invested during a downturn in
commodity prices and was attempting to claim fraud to recoup his
investment. Producer moved to dismiss Investor’s claim arguing that the
claim was not adequately pleaded with the requisite particularity. In
determining whether Investor’s complaint met the heightened pleading
standards required by state court rules, the court held that Investor failed to
adequately plead a claim for common law fraud by not adequately pleading
with particularity any of the five elements of common law fraud. Therefore,
the court granted Producer’s motion to dismiss. This is an unpublished
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before
citing the case as precedent.
Louisiana
Vekic v. Popich, 2017-0698 (La. 10/18/17); 2017–C–0698, 2017 WL
4737160.
Sublessee filed petition for writ of certiorari, stemming from a claim for
settlement proceeds resulting from an oil well explosion’s damage to oyster
leases. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the appellate court’s
decision, holding that Sublessee should have had the exclusive right to
manage any claims for damages resulting from the oil spill, and accordingly
should receive damages from settlement proceeds, rather than Sublessor.
The court here disagreed with appellate court’s finding that Sublessee, who
ultimately became Purchaser, was precluded from recovering damage
proceeds from the event occurring prior to the official purchase. Instead, the
court held that the oyster lease agreement between the parties included a
provision delegating the responsibility for all claims for damages to oyster
leases to be managed by Sublessee. The court found no merit in Sublessor’s
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argument that Sublessee is a “subsequent purchaser,” and was thus
precluded from claiming damages regarding the oyster leases. The court
held instead that all “rights and responsibilities” were placed on Sublessee
through the lease agreement in exchange for the rent payment before the
damages occurred, and accordingly, the court found that the proceeds
belong to him. Additionally, because the agreement was unclear on who
would receive proceeds in amounts that would be in excess of the normal
rent payment, the court found it reasonable to examine extrinsic evidence to
make that determination. However, the court added that even without
examining extrinsic evidence, the agreement itself pointed to the parties’
intent that no additional proceeds would go to Sublessor, over and above
the amount of the rent payment. The court asserted here that the outcome of
the claims for damages was irrelevant for these purposes, and the mission
here was merely to exercise “contractual interpretation” to determine who
held the responsibility to handle claims.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
4th Circuit
Pieper v. United States, No. 16-2035, 2017 WL 5033023 (4th Cir. Sept. 15,
2017).
Residents brought action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for
injuries resulting from the United States Army’s waste disposal and
remediation practices at an active base. Residents claimed: (1) the Army
negligently disposed of hazardous chemicals; and (2) the Army failed to
adequately remediate the resulting groundwater contamination. United
States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that
Residents were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case, finding that
the waste disposal and remediation decisions fell within the discretionary
function exception because: (1) the decisions involved discretionary
judgment; and (2) were susceptible to policy analysis. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding and reasoning of the
district court, holding that the Army’s waste practices did fall within the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. This is an unpublished
opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
5th Circuit
United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 875 F.3d 170 (5th Cir.
2017).
United States brought action against tugboat owner (“Owner”) after
300,000-gallon oil spill in Mississippi River. Owner was found responsible
under the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”), and United States sought recovery of
government payments made to clean the spill, as well as declaration that
Owner was liable for all costs and damages resulting from the spill. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of United States, but
Owner appealed, contending that it was entitled to the third-party defense
under OPA or, alternatively, that it was entitled to limit its liability. Under
OPA, a party must establish that it exercised due care with respect to the oil
concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the
third party. Under an alternative section, limits on liability do not apply if
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the incident was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct of or the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction,
or operating regulation by the responsible party, or someone acting under a
contractual relationship with the responsible party. Upon appeal, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s determination, holding
that: (1) the phrase “in connection with,” under OPA, necessitated third
party conduct that was causally or logically related to a contractual
relationship; and (2) the phrase “pursuant to,” under OPA, necessitated that
third party conduct be committed in the course of carrying out the terms of
the contract. The Fifth Circuit thus found that Owner was not entitled to a
third-party defense under the OPA, nor was it entitled to the OPA’s general
limit on liability.
9th Circuit
TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 872 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017).
Operator of an aeronautical manufacturing plant sued the United States
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) to get compensation for costs associated with
cleaning up soil and groundwater contamination around the plant.
Operator’s primary client was the United States Military, and some of
Operator’s contracts with the Military required using some hazardous
substances which led to the contamination. Operator complied with
remediation requirements under CERCLA. The district court found for the
government and allocated all cleanup costs to Operator and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. There is no dispute that
Operator and the government are potentially responsible parties—a
threshold requirement of CERCLA. On appeal, Operator argues that: (1) the
district court incorrectly analyzed liability on the basis of “fault” instead of
strict liability; (2) the district court incorrectly determined that the
government’s status as “owner” and not “operator” is dispositive regarding
cost allocation; and (3) the government should bear greater costs because of
the contractual requirements of using hazardous material. The appellate
court determined that the lower court’s “fault” analysis was not an abuse of
discretion because “of the evolving awareness of the hazardous nature of
the chemicals at issue, and [Operator’s] adaptation to more stringent
environmental standards.” The district court’s “owner” vs. “operator”
analysis was not an abuse of discretion either because of the government’s
two-decades-long absence from the operation site. However, the district
court did err by treating two circuit precedents as being “outliers.”
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Specifically, these precedents were similar because in those cases the
government also required use of hazardous substances. Ultimately, the
court reversed by noting it would be a “180 degree departure from our prior
case law” if it were to allocate to operator “100 percent of CERCLA
cleanup costs that were largely incurred during war-effort production.”
D.C. Circuit
Mayo v. Reynolds, 875 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Wildlife photographers (“Photographers”) sued the National Park Service
(“NPS”), challenging the NPS’s elk hunting program. The program sought
to reduce elk overpopulation by authorizing recreational hunting of elk and
a reduction of supplemental feed in Wyoming's Grand Teton National
Park(“Park”). Photographers argued that the NPS was required to prepare a
new NEPA analysis every year that it implemented the fifteen-year elkreduction program, disclosing and analyzing the unique environmental
effects of each year's hunt. Because no such analysis was done in 2015,
Photographers claimed that the NPS’s action violated NEPA. NPS moved
for summary judgment. The trial court granted NPS’s motion, finding that
NPS could rely on the 2007 Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in
making its annual elk-reduction decisions because that document “took the
requisite ‘hard look’ at the potential environmental effects that might result
from continuing the elk reduction program in the Park as a method of
managing the herd.” Photographers appealed, and the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that all the environmental
effects seen during the years after the 2007 EIS had been anticipated and
analyzed in the original environmental assessment and, therefore, NPS had
no duty to prepare a supplemental or new environmental impact statement.
Additionally, the court ruled that because an agency’s decision whether to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement under NEPA
requires substantial agency expertise, the court must defer to the agency’s
informed discretion.
C.D. California
Limo Co. v. Chem. Milling Int'l Corp., No. 2:17-cv-02345-SVW-RAO,
2017 WL 4358423 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017).
Landowner sued prior tenant, Corporation, claiming that Corporation
violated Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
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Liability Act (“CERCLA”) regulations and caused contamination, health
hazards, and damage to Landowner’s property. In this suit’s procedural
history, the district court granted the motion for default judgment that is the
subject of this case because procedural requirements for default judgment
were met. The court relied on factors laid out in case law, used to determine
when it is appropriate to grant default judgment. Using these factors, the
court determined that, first, there would have been no other recourse for
remedy in this case, so there was a high possibility of prejudice. Second,
evaluating the merits of the case, the subject site met CERCLA’s definition
of “facility,” and strict liability was imposed as a result of Corporation’s
actions. Further, a remedial compensation lawsuit was authorized under the
California Hazardous Substances Account Act (“Act”). Therefore,
Landowner was authorized under the Act to pursue responsible parties who
have caused damage, and could hold them liable for “past and future
response costs” via declaratory decree. Since Corporation was a tenant and
held a duty not to damage the subject property, but instead caused
groundwater and soil contamination which depleted the property of its
proper use, Landowner’s negligence, nuisance and waste claims were each
meritorious. Likewise, the ongoing nature of the contamination reflected an
ongoing trespass. Since there had been no contest, or even appearance by
Corporation, and therefore no explanations or additional evidence given in
defense, the court found that the grant of default judgment was allowable.
All factors considered supported granting of default judgment in this case.
D. Idaho
FMC Corp. v. Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 2017 WL 4322393 (D.
Idaho Sept. 28, 2017).
Company operated a phosphorus production plant on 1,450 acres of
property that it owned which lied mostly within a Tribal Reservation. Its
operations produced twenty-two million tons of waste products that were
stored on the Reservation in twenty-three ponds; the waste was radioactive,
carcinogenic, poisonous, and likely to persist for decades with no safe
method to move it off-site. The EPA declared the site a Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
Superfund clean-up site and charged Company with violating the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). To avoid litigation over the
RCRA charges, Company negotiated with the EPA over a consent decree
with the condition that Company had to obtain Tribal permits for work it
would do on the Reservation under the Consent Decree. Tribe demanded
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$100,000,000.00 for the permits, or would drop the fee to $1500,000.00 a
year if Company consented to Tribal jurisdiction. Company consented to
get the lower permit fee and subsequently challenged the fees by showing
evidence that the stored waste had caused no harm and that the EPA's
containment program got rid of any need to impose substantial fees. Tribe
produced evidence that the waste was severely toxic, and the Tribal
Appellate Court issued a judgment against Company requiring them to pay
the annual fee of $1,500,000.00. Company appealed and brought the issue
to the federal district court of whether Tribe could enforce the
judgment. The court found that Tribe had jurisdiction over Company based
upon Company's consent and the catastrophic threat Company's waste poses
to Tribal governance, cultural traditions, and health and welfare. The court
reasoned that the recognition and enforcement of tribal judgments in federal
court rests upon principles of comity. This case has since been appealed,
but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Swenson, No. 1:17-cv-00120-DCN,
2017 WL 4855846 (D. Idaho Oct. 26, 2017).
Purchaser attempted to consolidate a prior suit with a new claim naming
Broker as responsible party, claiming misrepresentation of the subject
property’s groundwater and soil prior to a land purchase. In determining if
Purchaser’s claims should be dismissed or if the claims should be
consolidated, the district court ultimately granted Broker’s motion for
partial dismissal of negligence claim and partially granted Broker’s motion
for summary judgment. The court held that the cases should not be
consolidated because to do so would hinder efficiency of the court system
and would be an unfair burden on the Broker. However, the court did allow
for the second case to be stayed until there was a resolution of the first case.
The court found both sides’ arguments regarding statute of limitations
valid, but said the date from which the statute of limitations begins to run is
a matter for the jury. The court applied a four-year statute of limitations
because the violations were of the Brokerage Act, not only a breach of
contract. Despite Purchaser’s objection to the defense that the claim is timebarred, the court said that even though Broker concealed relevant
information, Purchaser has not asserted that it relied on Broker’s
information to make the decision not to file. Therefore, the court
determined that Broker could assert statute of limitations as a defense. The
court held that the claim is not precluded because the new claim is against a
new defendant, (not against Realty Company, party to the previous case)
and no final judgment had been rendered. However, the court determined
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that, since the claims derived from the “same transactional nucleus of facts”
and that there was privity between Broker and Realty Company, (through
their “principal-agent” relationship) these were duplicative claims and
could not be brought separately in the same court.
W. Watersheds Project v. United States Forest Serv., No.: 1:15-cv-00218REB, 2017 WL 4927660 (D. Idaho Oct. 31, 2017).
Environmental Group sued United States Forest Service (“USFS”) for
permitting cattle grazing near streams that contained protected fish species.
Cattle Grazers intervened in the lawsuit. Environmental Group alleged that:
(1) the grazing had diminished the quality of the streams; (2) the fish
population had decreased; and (3) USFS had arbitrarily and capriciously
allowed the destruction of the habitats that USFS had a duty to protect
under the INFISH strategy previously promulgated by USFS. Both USFS
and Cattle Grazers asserted that INFISH protections did not apply to cattle
grazing operations and that even if they did, there is no demonstrated
causation between the cattle grazing and degradation of the streams. All
parties moved for summary judgment. The district court found that INFISH
does apply to the cattle grazing operations, even on lower priority streams
that do not contain endangered fish. The court also decided that USFS did
not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it granted grazing permits and that
Environmental Group needed to demonstrate that the grazing has caused
poor stream quality. Because Environmental Group did not demonstrate the
causal nexus, the court granted summary judgment for USFS and Cattle
Grazers. This case has since been appealed, but there is not final decision
from the higher court as of publication.
W. Watersheds Project v. United States Forest Serv., No. 1:17-CV-434CWD, 2017 WL 5571574 (D. Idaho Nov. 20, 2017).
Organization sued United States Forest Service (“USFS”) alleging that: (1)
USFS had violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”); and
(2) USFS had violated the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”).
Organization sought a preliminary injunction to prevent USFS from
allowing domestic sheep to graze on the Snakey and Kelly Canyon
allotments (“Allotments”) in the Caribou-Targhee National Forest
(“Forest”). Organization argued that allowing domestic sheep to graze on
the Allotments posed a risk to the bighorn sheep population due to the
potential transmission of pneumonia pathogens. The court found that USFS
raised significant issues regarding the likelihood of success on the merits
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for Organization’s NEPA claim because of the potential applicability of a
2013 settlement agreement. The court concluded that without further
information, it could not sufficiently assess the likelihood of success of the
NEPA claim. However, the court found that Organization’s NFMA claim
was likely to succeed on the merits, that irreparable harm was likely, that
the balance tipped in favor of Organization, and that the injunction would
be in the public interest. Therefore, the court granted Organization’s motion
for a preliminary injunction against USFS.
D. Nevada
Diamond X Ranch LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 3:13-cv-00570-MMDWGC, 2017 WL 4349223 (D. Nev. Sept. 29, 2017).
Ranch Owner filed suit against Oil Company concerning the cleanup of
acid mine drainage from a Superfund site and its surrounding areas. Ranch
Owner claimed that its ranch was contaminated by Oil Company’s acid
mine drainage to the point that the ranch could not be developed into a
residential subdivision. The district court first determined that Nevada
choice-of-law standards would control Ranch Owner’s tort claims because
the subdivision was to be located entirely in Nevada and the diversion point
in the creek leading to the contamination was in Nevada. The court then
ruled on several motions as follows: (1) it granted Oil Company’s motion to
bar Ranch Owner’s strict liability claim based on the statute of limitations
but was denied as to the state law tort claims for nuisance, trespass,
negligence, and misappropriation of water rights; (2) the court granted Oil
Company’s motion for summary judgment regarding Ranch Owner’s public
nuisance claim because in Nevada, no private right of action for public
nuisance existed; (3) the court denied Oil Company’s motions for summary
judgment for trespass and to limit damages based on geographic location;
(4) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to Ranch Owner’s remaining
state law tort claims and, thus, summary judgment on those claims was
denied; (5) Ranch Owner was precluded from recovering costs after
February 2012—when Oil Company included ranch in a study regarding
the issue in contention—but Oil Company’s motion for summary judgment
on Ranch Owner’s first Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) claim was otherwise denied;
and (6) Oil Company’s motion for summary judgment on Ranch Owner’s
second CERCLA claim was granted because Ranch Owner was a covered
person for purposes of liability under federal law regarding contiguous
properties.
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D. New Jersey
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 15-6468
(FLW)(LHG), 2017 WL 4953903 (D. N.J. Nov. 1, 2017).
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) sought to recover natural
resource damages from Company after Company discharged MTBE, an
organic chemical compound derived from methanol and isobutylene that
spreads easily into groundwater supplies, into groundwater of DEP’s trial
sites. Such contamination made the drinking water unacceptable for
consumption, posing a risk to human health. A dispute existed between the
parties concerning the damages to which DEP might be entitled should the
factfinder find in DEP’s favor on its strict liability Spill Act claim, which
sought primary restoration damages for the cost of restoring the
contaminated groundwater at the trial sites to its condition before contact
with human civilization. Company argued that DEP was not entitled to
primary restoration damages because Company was already remediating the
groundwater under New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act
("NJDEP")-approved remediation plans. The court held that Company's
motion in limine for leave to file a motion for partial summary judgment
based upon the alternative burden of "a significant threat to human health,
flora, or fauna" was not supported by good cause and thus denied. It also
held that DEP’s burden of proof at trial on its claims for primary restoration
damages would be to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its
primary restoration plan was "practicable," meaning "reasonably capable of
being done" in light of site-specific realities. Such a standard would require
a fact and circumstance specific inquiry.
Strategic Envtl. Partners, LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 12-3252,
2017 WL 4678199 (D.N.J Oct. 16, 2017).
In 2010, Company bought property containing a landfill which it intended
to develop into a solar energy farm. Company claims that from the 1950s
through the 1970s, when the landfill accepted solid waste, Former Owners
sent garbage containing hazardous substances to the landfill, causing
contamination that needed to be cleaned up. In October 2011, Company
entered into an agreement with Former Owners concerning the closure of
the landfill and the post-closure plans for the land. It also entered into an
Administrative Consent Order (“ACO”) with Former Owners stating that
the parties were consenting to the ACO’s terms pursuant to the authority of
Former Owners under the Solid Waste Management Act (“SWMA”).
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Through the process of closing and capping the landfill, Company incurred
extensive response costs and alleged that this high cost arose from Former
Owners’ polluted and contaminated of the landfill with hazardous
substances. Thus, Company argued that Former Owners were liable for part
of the cost under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”). Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue
of CERCLA liability. Company claimed that it discovered the hazardous
substances on the property due to testing and laboratory measures
undertaken in 2011 and that it should be reimbursed by Former Owners for
the testing costs and the costs of the cleanup because of the agreement it
had entered into with Former Owners and because Former Owners had
polluted the landfill. Former Owners disagreed, arguing that the response
costs were undertaken prior to the investigation and discovery as evidenced
in the ACO and that the laboratory costs were part of Company fulfilling its
responsibilities under the ACO. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of Former Owners, holding that Company lacked evidence of
incurring CERCLA response costs. This is an unpublished opinion of the
court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
D. Puerto Rico
United States v. Puerto Rico Indus. Dev. Co., No. 15-2328 (FAB), 2017
WL 6061011 (D.P.R. Dec. 7, 2017).
Contamination was discovered in water beneath Company’s property, so
the EPA investigated and attempted to decontaminate the water. The United
States sought reimbursement under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) from
Company for expenditures made to decontaminate the water. United States
filed for summary judgment for the court to find that: (1) Company is prima
facie liable under CERCLA; (2) Company is ineligible for the secured
creditor exemption from CERCLA; and (3) Company cannot claim the
defenses of third party fault, innocent landowner, and contiguous
landowner later in litigation. The district court found that Company is prima
facie liable under CERCLA because United States demonstrated that
Company’s property is a facility, that Company is potentially responsible
for the contamination, that a release of hazardous substances had occurred
on Company’s property, and that United States had incurred response costs
from the contamination. The court also found that Company was not
eligible for the secured creditor exemption from CERCLA because to

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4

2018]

Recent Case Decisions

1299

qualify an entity must only have indicia of ownership of the property such
as a creditor would have, whereas Company actively managed the property.
The court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate for the
issues of third party fault, innocent landowner, and contiguous landowner
defenses because United States had not discovered the source of the
contamination, which was a necessary determination before the preclusion
of defenses based on information about the source of the contamination.
Company also filed a third-party complaint against tenants on the
contaminated property, which the court the parties to confer upon prior to
the next pretrial conference to set forth their positions regarding the
complaint. Company filed a motion to defer the disposition of the summary
judgment motion, which the court denied because no more discovery by
Company would bear upon the issues presented in the summary judgment
motion.
D. Utah
United States v. Par. Chem. Co., No. 2:09-cv-804-CW, 2017 WL 4857547
(D. Utah Oct. 24, 2017).
Trustee held the assets of a former chemical company and pharmaceutical
corporation (collectively, “Company”). Investment Company owned
property adjoining the Trust Property (“Property”), which it leased to a
drywall business, and also held an easement (“Easement”) on the Property.
Trustee attempted to sell the Property free and clear of its easement.
However, Investment Company opposed the sale because the sale of the
Easement would require it to relocate the business at “significant expense.”
Investment Company argued that: (1) the United States' Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
lien (“Lien”) on the Property was not perfected under Utah law and, thus,
was junior or secondary to the Easement; and (2) that the court lacked
authority to extinguish the Easement in these circumstances. The court
ruled that it need not address whether CERCLA preempts state law on lien
filing requirements because the EPA sent Company a letter notifying it that
the CERCLA Lien had been perfected by recording the Notice of Federal
Lien with the Utah County Recorder, which complied with Utah law.
Additionally, the court held that it did have the authority to sell the
Easement pursuant to its authority from “the court's general equitable
power to order sales of property within its jurisdiction on terms ordered by
the court.” Upon these findings, the court exercised its inherent authority
and discretion to order the sale of the Property free and clear of the
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Easement. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from
the higher court as of publication.
E.D California
Conservation Cong. v. United States Forest Serv., No. 2:16-CV-00864MCE-AC, 2017 WL 4340254 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017).
Conservation Group asserted twelve claims of relief against United States
Forest Service (“USFS”) related to USFS’s decision to push forward its
Lava Hazardous Fuels Reduction Project (“Lava Project”). Specifically,
Conservation Group claimed violations of the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”), the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), and the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”) challenging USFS’s decision to exclude the Gray Wolf from its
Biological Assessment analysis of the potential effects of its Lava Project
on certain species. Conservation Group sought permission to add fourteen
documents exhibiting the “movement and presence of the Gray Wolf in
California” which supported multiple of its claims. The court noted that
under the APA, the scope of the court’s review was limited to the
administrative record to the agency at the time of the challenged decision.
However, this rule only applies when there is “no other adequate remedy in
court,” and since the ESA provides a citizen suit remedy, the APA does not
apply in those suits. The court stated that its review in context of the claims
brought under the ESA’s substantive citizen suit provision must not be
limited by the APA and, thus, granted Conservation Group’s motion submit
the additional evidence.
Earth Island Inst. v. Elliott, No. 1:17-cv-01320-LJO-MJS, 2017 WL
5526572 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2017).
Environmental Organization sued Forest Supervisor and the United States
Forest Service (“USFS”) seeking a preliminary injunction to halt two
projects to fell large swaths of dead and dying fire-damaged trees.
Environmental Organization feared that the projects would adversely affect
endangered and non-endangered wildlife in the area and argued that the
circumstances required further analysis before the project could begin and
sought to postpone it. Forest Supervisor argued that the felling project fit
within one of three categorical exclusions to the National Environmental
Policy Act, allowing it to go forward without further analysis than what was
done via an Environmental Impact Statement or an Environmental
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Assessment. The district court denied Environmental Organization’s
motion. It found that: (1) Environmental Organization did not show that its
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Environmental Organization did not
establish a likelihood of success on the merits for its claim that the sensitive
wildlife species that would be affected was enough to create an
extraordinary circumstance that made a categorical exclusion inappropriate;
(3) Forest Supervisor was not required to assess the two projects’ effects as
cumulative or connected; (4) on the present record, the limited scope of the
project did not amount to a sufficient showing of irreparable harm; (5)
Environmental Organization did not make a sufficient showing of
environmental harm to outweigh the risk of economic harm associated with
delaying the project; and, (6) the safety concerns attendant to a delay of the
project significantly outweighed Environmental Organization’s chances of
showing environmental harm on the merits, leading public interest to weigh
strongly against the preliminary injunction.
S.D. California
Cox v. Ametek, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01211-GPC-AGS, 2017 WL 4792424
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017).
Decedent's Family brought suit against Manufacturer, asserting a wrongful
death claim related to the death of their mother ("Decedent"). Manufacturer
used land in California to manufacture aircraft engine parts for two decades
that was located near Decedent's residence. Manufacturer stored toxic waste
in an underground sump beneath its property, which leaked chlorinated
solvents and other chemicals into the groundwater and subsurface soil. This
leak thereafter migrated into groundwater beyond Manufacturer's property
boundary. Measurements taken in 1987 and 2007 showed that the measured
chlorinated solvent concentrations exceeded California's "Basin Plan Water
Quality Objectives." Several of the chemicals contained in the leakage are
associated with serious health risks, including cancer, according to the
EPA. In 1998, the California Regional Water Quality Control Board
("Board") named Manufacturer a responsible party in a cleanup and
abatement order ("CAO") that required Manufacturer to duly delineate the
plume and comply with remediation tasks. Manufacturer chose not to
comply with the order and ignored subsequent letters and violation notices
sent by Board. Decedent lived directly above the groundwater
contamination plume from 1976 until her passing in 2001, which was
caused by a kidney tumor. In the present case, Manufacturer filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing that Decedent's Family failed to satisfy the elements for
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causation. The district court rejected Manufacturer's motion to dismiss
because the complaint of Decedent's Family sufficiently states a plausible
claim that Manufacturer's inaction caused Decedent's untimely death. The
court rejected Manufacturer's argument that its failure to comply with the
CAO could not have contributed to Decedent's death since Decedent had
already been exposed to the chemicals for two decades prior to the CAO
because a cleanup effort could have plausibly allowed Decedent to have
lived longer because her exposure could have been lessened.
S.D. Ohio
Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 3:13-cv-115, 2017 WL
5956911 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2017).
Corporations owned a landfill site that was contaminated. In 2013 and
2016, Corporations entered into settlement agreements with the EPA to
remedy the contamination. Corporations then sought contribution under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (“CERCLA”) from eight other Companies, alleging that the other
Companies were also responsible for the contamination of the sight. Each
of the Companies then moved for summary judgment on the issues of
whether each Company used the landfill and if it did, whether it dumped
hazardous materials in it. The district court in this case only addressed the
first issue of whether each Company had used the landfill. In doing so, the
court found for three of the Companies finding that they had not used the
landfill for various reasons, and thus granted summary judgement in
Companies favor. For the remaining five companies, there remained an
issue of fact about their use of the landfill, thus their motions for summary
judgement were not granted and the cases against them are proceeding.
S.D. New York
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04
Civ. 4968 (VSB), 2017 WL 5468758 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2017).
Water District was charged with maintaining groundwater quality in
Orange County, California and alleges that the use and handling of Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) contaminated groundwater within its
jurisdiction. Oil and gas companies (“Companies”) negotiated a case
management order (“CMO”). Following the adoption of the CMO, the
judge granted judgment in favor of Companies, dismissing all claims
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against them based on res judicata and finding that consent judgments from
2002 and 2005 barred claims in this action. Water District appealed that and
the summary judgment decisions to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
which vacated and remanded the decision back to the district court. Water
District also made a motion requesting an issue of a suggestion of remand
to the judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“Panel”) to remand the
remaining proceedings to the another district court. In response, first district
court found that all consolidated pretrial proceedings were complete and
accordingly granted Water District’s motion.
State
California
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal.Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 226 Cal. Rptr.
3d 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Environmental Group brought a mandate petition under the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) challenging the environmental
impact report (EIR) and related project approvals for two natural resource
plans for a proposed development. At trial, the court set aside the project
approvals, ordered Department of Fish and Wildlife (“Department”) to set
aside its certification of the final EIR, and enjoined Department from
proceeding. The appeals court reversed. The California Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court, holding that the EIR was deficient both
because its finding that the project’s greenhouse gas emissions were
insignificant was “not supported by a reasoned explanation based on
substantial evidence,” and because its measure of protecting a fish species
by capturing and relocating it was a prohibited taking under the Fish and
Game Code. Following remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of
Environmental Group as to greenhouse gas emissions and in favor of
Department on all other issues. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that:
(1) a trial court has the authority to partially decertify an EIR under CEQA
following a trial, hearing, or remand; (2) a trial court has the power to leave
Department’s project approvals in place after partially decertifying an EIR;
and (3) the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to set aside all
project approvals after court suspended project activity pending correction
of partially-decertified EIR.
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Washoe Meadows Cmty. v. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d
238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Community sought to set aside approval of a project intended to address
environmental concerns posed by a golf course on the basis that the
proposed plan violated the California Environmental Quality Act
(“CEQA”). The trial court set aside the approval of the project, and the
State appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court on the basis that
the project description was not “accurate, stable, and finite” as required by
CEQA. Instead of providing an accurate, stable, and finite plan so that the
public may comment on the proposed plan, the State provided five very
different alternatives which may or may not have been ultimately approved.
Therefore, this did not give the public anything concrete to grasp which
impaired their “ability to participate in the environmental review
process”—something that is essential to CEQA. Presenting the public with
such a moving target was prejudicial (showing prejudice is a CEQA
requirement) because it was not certain that any of the alternative plan
would ultimately be selected or approved. Accordingly, the court affirmed
the lower court’s determination that the plan’s approval should be vacated.
Michigan
Michigan Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. City of Flint, No. 17-12107, 2017 WL
4641897 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2017).
In response to public health risks associated with City water supply, the
EPA, in January 2016, determined that the water posed an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health. The EPA then issued an
Emergency Administrative Order (“Order”) imposing requirements on City
to improve the water conditions. Due to lack of action by City, State
Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) asked the court to order
City to take action and brought a motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the district court found that DEQ had established the
necessary requirements for a permanent injunction to compel City to enter a
long-term water supply contract consistent with the EPA Order. As a result,
the court granted DEQ’s motion for summary judgment in part and further
ordered that City choose a satisfactory long-term drinking water source
under EPA’s Order on or before October 23, 2017.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4

2018]

Recent Case Decisions

1305

New Hampshire
Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16-cv-242-JL,
2017 WL 6043956 (D.N.H. Dec. 6, 2017).
Landowners sued Manufacturer for economic damages after Manufacturer
allegedly released contaminants into public water systems and
contaminated Landowners’ properties. Manufacturer moved to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety. First, Manufacturer claimed that the release of the
chemicals into public systems constitutes an injury only to the groundwater,
which Landowners did not have rights to that groundwater. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the groundwater’s contamination could
have reasonably led to the lost use and enjoyment of Landowners’ real
property. Dismissal at this point in the litigation was therefore improper.
Second, Manufacturer claimed that the lack of physical symptoms to
Landowners’ themselves did not warrant the reward of medical monitoring
damages. Finding that New Hampshire law was not well-adapted to answer
this question, the court denied Manufacturer’s motion to strike the reward
without prejudice, and is considering whether to certify the question to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court. Third, Manufacturer claimed that the
claim of trespass was improper, because there was no deliberate entry onto
Landowners’ properties. The court denied this motion, because the claim
included language that the trespass could have been negligent rather than
deliberate. Finally, the court did grant the Manufacturer’s motion to dismiss
any claims regarding unjust enrichment, because New Hampshire law does
not recognize claims of unjust enrichment outside of contract law.
New York
Matter of Global Cos. LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation,
155 A.D.3d 93 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2017).
In a case arising from a cross appeal from a judgment of the Supreme
Court, Albany County, Applicant owned a sixty-three-acre petroleum
transfer and storage facility in the City of Albany. In 2013, he submitted an
application to the Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to
modify its clean air permit under the Clean Air Act in an attempt to expand
its crude oil storage capabilities. In 2015, DEC notified Applicant that it
would rescind the notice of completed application (“NOCA”) and rendered
a negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(“SEQRA”). In May 2015, DEC notified Applicant that it was rescinding
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the NOCA and intended to rescind the negative SEQRA declaration. In
response, Applicant commenced a proceeding for declaratory judgment
against DEC seeking a judgment: (1) compelling DEC to make a final
decision on its permit application; (2) annulling DEC’s rescission of the
NOCA and compelling DEC to complete its permit application review; (3)
declaring that DEC failed to act in a timely manner and could not rescind
the negative SEQRA declaration; and (4) compelling DEC to issue an
amended negative SEQRA declaration. The trial court partially dismissed
Applicant’s action for declaratory judgment. It also directed DEC to render
a decision on the permit application within sixty days, but the court
dismissed Applicant’s third and fourth causes of action. The appellate court,
found that the prior court properly granted intervenor status but erred in
directing DEC to act on the permit application within sixty days because
DEC was authorized to rescind the NOCA and the rescission was both
timely and rationally based. The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
Vill. of Pomona v. Town of Ramapo, 64 N.Y.S.3d 80 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
Village was dissatisfied with determinations of Town Board on a proposed
development project, an amendment to the Town Plan to permit the project,
and the rezoning of the property on which the project was to be constructed.
Village sought to invalidate the determinations, contending that Town
Board did not adequately consider the effect of the project on community
character or the environmental impact of the project in proximity to a
pipeline. Village also asserted that Town Board violated municipal law. The
trial court denied Village’s petition and dismissed the proceeding. The
appellate court reversed, holding that Town Board did not adequately
consider the environmental effect of the project’s proximity to the pipeline.
Youngewirth v. Town of Ramapo Town Board, 65 N.Y.S.3d 540 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2017).
An Individual commenced proceeding seeking review of determinations of
Town Board resolving to approve a findings statement pursuant to the State
Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) in connection with a
proposed development project, to amend a comprehensive plan of the town
so as to permit the development project, and to rezone the real property on
which the development project was proposed to be constructed. The county
court denied petition and Individual appealed. The appellate court reversed
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and granted Individual’s petition, holding that Town Board failed to take a
“hard look” at the environmental impact of placing proposed development
in close proximity to existing gas pipeline, that Individual did not establish
that rezoning of property was in clear conflict with the town’s
comprehensive plan, and that town’s change in zoning did not violate Town
Law governing zoning districts.
Pennsylvania
Becker v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 560 C.D. 2017, 2017 WL 5907706 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Dec. 1, 2017).
Trustee petitions from an order of the Environmental Hearing Board
(“Board”) dismissing an appeal from the Department of Environmental
Protection’s (“Department”) decision finding that he had rerouted a stream
without a permit and caused water pollution in violation of the Clean
Streams Law (“CSL”) and Dam Safety and Encroachments Act (“DSEA”).
Trustee appealed, contending that Board erred because the channel he
routed was not a “stream” as defined under the laws. The appellate court
concluded that the Trustee’s channel at issue satisfied the definitions of a
regulated stream under the CSL and the DSEA because the stream on his
property was a channel of conveyance of surface water with defined bed
and banks and an intermittent flow. Accordingly, the court affirmed
Board’s order but remanded for the limited purpose of imposing an
alternate remedy on Trustee or obtaining permission to permit the work to
be done and coordinating enforcement of the final orders.
West Virginia
State ex rel. ERP Envtl. Fund, Inc. v. McGraw, 805 S.E.2d 800 (W. Va.
2017).
Residents sued alleging that a coal company (“Company”) contaminated
their well water, even after the Department of Environmental Protection
(“DEP”) determined that Company did not cause contamination. Residents
sought to require Company to provide emergency, temporary, and
permanent water replacement. After determining that Company’s
operations affected Resident’s water supply, the circuit court granted a writ
of mandamus ordering DEP to compel Company to provide emergency
water and temporary replacement water until a permanent supply was
established by Company. DEP issued an order to Company to provide water
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replacement and an order to ERP Environmental Fund (“ERP”) to ensure
compliance. ERP petitioned for a writ of prohibition against enforcement of
the mandamus. The Supreme Court of West Virginia granted the writ of
prohibition. It held that the circuit court lacked the necessary grounds to
compel water replacement to Residents because DEP found no
contamination in the permitted area. Furthermore, without a finding of
contamination by DEP, there was no basis for issuing a violation.
Therefore, DEP did not fail to perform a non-discretionary duty for which
mandamus could be granted.
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